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INTRODUeTION
1

Purpose of The Study

v.. -,

The electric utility indus:try ih the United States is now,

and has been in varying degrees since its inception, pluralistic
in nature. It is composed of investor-owned systems (private),
local municipal systems owned by various comniunities, public^

owned cooperatives, and state and federal projects. As a single
entity, it provides the consumers of electric power in this country
with energy which, at the retail level, is genera.lly responsive

to consumer needs and reasonably priced.^ This, however, has not
always been the prevalent situation in the industry.

As I shall

point out in Chapter 2, the early days were fraught with non

competitive practices, lack of service, and unrealistically high
rate structures.

As a result of the many shortcomings within the industry

during its formative years, the public sector of the economybegan to provide increasing segments of the populatibn with
electric power which they had either been denied by the priyate
sector or they felt themselves to be paying exorbitant rates.

As a result, the multi-ownership pluralisitt of the providers

within the industry became directly piopbrtionaK^ the. ■ Gontrb

versial rhetoric.

Both sides have attempted, and in many cases

succeeded, to politicize the issues to attain their self-perceived

ends. According to Wildavsky,^
Participation in politics han come to be a normal
concomitant of the power business:.

V

The pblemic debate has now polarized itself into two major factions:

the public power advocates generally personified in the image of
the American Public Power Association (APPA) and the private
power interests speaking through the voice of the Edison Electric
Institute (EEI).

The APPA consistently publishes data which, it claims,

proves that publicly-owried electric systems provide less costly
power for the consumer and are more responsive to their needs.

As such, claims the APPA, publicly-owned systems are more bene
ficial to America.

Not At all intimidated by these claims, the

EEI dilutes these assertions with counterpoints.

If lower rates

do exist for some publicly-owned systems,^ then the primary



reason for this apparent benefit is that the publicly-owned
systems pay little, if any, taxes.

Another reason they generally

mention is that the public systems may have competitive rates

because they have the advantage of the large scale generation
projects^ power pools, and high voltage transmission systems

installed at the expense of the investor-owned utilities.^ The
publicly-owned systems, then, benefit from the investments of

the private Utilities by being able to purchase wholesale
power for resale at a cost less than they would incur if they
had to generate it themselves.

Taxation, or the lack of it, however, is the most significant
cost savings for the nation's public power systems.

To quote

from the EEI:^
At present, the nonpayment of taxes is the most
important advantage municipal electric systems have
over electric companies and this is obviously unfair
to the 78 percent of the electric customers in the

country that are served by (private) electric companies.

It is indeed anomalous that, in our ptiyate enter
prise society, customers o£ investor-owned enter

,

prises are penalized by having to pay in the cost of
their electric service substantially higher taxes
than the customers of government-owned electric
systems.

. . . electric companies paid about 4 times the taxes
as did these government-owned electric systems (in
■ 1972)
..
■■

Municlpal systems. Since their inception, have been condemned
as wasteful of taxpayers' dollars, overt socialism, and a major
encroachment on private enterprise in a capitalistic society.

1

Prior Studies

Numerous studies have been done to ascertain which type of
ownership is more beneficial to the ultimate consumer.

Most,

as I have already mentioned in the prior section, tend to be
published by groups with vested interests and are therefore
subject to inherent, if not manipulated, biases.

Two studies

that I reviewed during the research phase for this paper, however,
warrant special mention.

Robert^A. Meyer,^ in his comparative analysis of public
versus private ownership of electric utilities, used a sample
from the nationwide statistics applicable to the electric utility
industry.

His emphasis, while he did evaluate costs. Was to

determine which sector was using the least cost technology

available.

The data covered the years 1967, 1968, and 1969.

Through the application of duality theorems evaluating bivariate
data, he established that the public systems, on a nationwide
average, had lower production costs and that transmission costs
were about equal in both sectors.

Distribution and maintenance

costs, while substantially on a par, slightly favored public

systems as bein-g less expensive/ Rates, He found, were signi

ficantly lower in the public sector.

His Study of typical monthly

bills consistently found the private sector to be charging 8% 

281 more than that charged by public firms for the same consump
'tion level'.

.

The other study of significance regarding this public vs.

private ownership dichotomy was conducted by Audie L. Bevins, Jr.^
He neither evaluated cost of Service nor rates, as is commonly the

situation, but consumers attitudes and preferences.

His sample

included five of Wyoming's sixteen municipal systems and two
large communities in that state served by privately-owned electric
systems.

The results of his study inferred that consumers cur

rently being served by municipal systems were in favor of public
power (97.6%); that they were satisfied with the cost of

electricity; felt that public power profits were a fair way to
raise money for this community (88.8%); and did not conceive of

their utility bill as a form of taxation (89.7%).

Residents who

resided in the communities, served by the privately-owned utilities
had, surprisingly, similar views.

They were generally in favor

of municipal power systems and were about evenly divided on the

issue of whether or not their community should opt for a public

power system (41.3% yes - 46.7% no).

Those in favor generally

cited possible lower costs as the reason while those opposed
generally claimed that public power was socialistic or that\their
bills would be higher.

Statement of Purpose

' My purpose, then, mlT be to re-evaluate the question ;
concerning which type of ownership is more beneficial to the
consumer; public or private.

The scope of the analysis will

be primarily economic, and the population to be evaluated
will be geographically limited to the State of California.

This

is being done to keep the data at a manageable level and to
eliminate, as much as is possible, any inherent biases that might
I

be undetected and included in a survey of national proportion.

■ Hypotheses

To evaluate the major topic of the viability of publiclyowned electric systems in California, three major hypotheses
manifest themselves as being critical to; the analysis.

It is

my opinion, based on a review of the prior research on the
subject, that publicly-owned systems must fulfill, at least over

the long run, two major criteria.

They must offer, to the

ultimate consumer, energy at equal or less cost than he could

purchase it from a privately-owned supplier and, secondly, the

municipal system must provide in-lieu tax payments or general
government subsidies equal to the tax effort that would be made

by a privately-owned firm in the same jurisdiction.

If these

criteria are not met, then the public system offers no economic

advantage to the consumer and taxpayer of that community.

At this

juncture, I would like to state some caveats regarding this study
and, by implication, previous studies of the same nature.

The electric power industry is dynamic, not static, in
nature.

This is especially true since the Arab oil embargo

impacted the industry and caused rates to escalate in geometric

progression.^'^ As it is a dynamic industry, this study, and
any other of an economic nature, only takes a still-life picture
of the situation at a single point in time.

These "balance

sheet reports" will have to be constantly updated for signifi
cant trending data to develop.

As such, I wish to state that

the results I obtain will be of how the industry in California
was in 1975, not necessarily how it is now or if the same
relationships continue to exist.

The reader is also cautioned

to note that this study applies to California only.

No ambiguous

inference should be projected to encoropass the entire population
Of publicly-owned'Or privately-owned utilities.

The hypothesis testing will be classical in nature and
represent an objective view.

^ 

We will reject or fail to reject

each null hypothesis on the statistical significance of the
results Obtained according to normal testing procedures.

As is

generally the case in the classical mbde, the alternative hypo
thesis will be the logical statemeht of the regular hypothesis.

Rates

Our first hypothesis, then, concerns the rates paid to
utilities by ultimate consumers.

Power sold for resale is not

to be included at this time as it would not apply evenly across
all classes of utility ownership and may tend to distort the
results.

The data will be reviewed, analyzed, and tested with

the expected result that rates charged by publicly-owned systems
will be equal or less than those rates charged by privatelyowned utilities for similar quantities of energy.

In operational terms, the hypothesis can be stated:

HqI

Publicly-owned utility charges for electrical
energy consumption are equal to or less ( )
than those charges for the same consumption
from a privately-owned utility.

Publicly-owned utility charges for electrical
energy consumption are greater ( >■ ) than those

charges for the same consumption from a privately
'

owned utility.

Cost of Service

If the first operational objective is substantiated, we will
want to ascertain how any apparent lower rates are accomplished.
It logically follows that we will Want to evaluate the cost of

service for the different classes of ownership.

Cost of service

is interpreted to include, for reasons of equal cbmparison. Pro

duction, Transmission, .Distribution, Customer Account, and Admin
istrative Expenses.

It is recognized that there are also other

expenses that would be meaningful, such as debt service and capital
outlay. The initial review of the available data, however, indicates
that these components are so thoroughly occluded in the various

reports to be utilized that their inclusion would create exceptional

biases in the true cost of service, especially for the privatelyowned utilities.

A more.relevant comparison can be obtained if

we ignore these items and assume that they are paid out of

current depreciation, which is analyzed, and net profit.
Our basic premise, then, is that publicly-owned utilities

have equal to or lower cost of service per kilowatt-hour (KWH) of
sales. Stated operationally, the hypothesis becomes:
Hq:

Publicly-owned utilities have an overall cost of

service which is equal to or less f^ ) than

privately-owned systems.

H^:

Publicly-owned utilities have an overall cost

of service which is greater '(3;^) than privatelyowned systems.

:

Tax Effort

The last area of comparability that will be tested, and an

important one, is tax effort. As will be discussed in Chapter 3,
various sources were required to acquire the correct data.

In

one source document, the municipal systems were given no, or
only partial, credit for in-lieu tax contributions.

In the

same document, the private systems had a tax payment published
which resulted from their total operations, not 3'ust electric

sales.

I suspect that this situation has'snared many an unwary

researcher in the past and has, perhaps, led somewhat to the

current tax effort controversy.

It is my contention, however,

that publicly-owned,systems, in the aggregate, have a.tax effort
that is not significantly different from that of the investor-

owned firms.

Hq:

Stated operationally, the hypothesis becomes:

There is ^ (=) significant difference in the
tax effort between publicly vs. privately-owned
utilities.

'

There is a (?^) significant difference in tax

effort between publicly vs. privately-owned
utilities.

Methodology

The various prpcedures utilized for accumulating, analyzing,
and testing the data will be discussed in detail in each of the

appropriate chapters.

As an overview, however, the sample of

utilities will be as complete as possible.

All three of the

major privately-owned utilities will be included as well as all

of the publicly-owned systems included in the various reports

who have sales to ultimate customers:.

Federal and state projects

will be excluded so as not to distort the results.
Chapter Preview

■

'

Chapter 2 will cover, in a summary sense, the evolution
of public power systems in the^United States in both a

national perspective and within California.

In Chapter 3,

all of the data relevant to the study will be analyzed and
any discrepancies will be discussed.

Chapter 4 will devote

itself to testing the hypotheses as stated in the intro
duction and in Chapter 5 the results will be evaluated and
discussed.

^ ^ -10-

■ ■■

1.
;; •'

Federal Power Cominission, National Power Survey, (1964)
^
'P., 4.

2.

Aaron Wi1davsIcy, Dixon-Yates:

A Study in.Power Politics,

CNew Haven, Yale University Pres^, 1962], p. 3.
3.

See:

American Public Power Associationj The Peoples Right
to Choose, (Washington D.C., 1974) pp. 4-6.

4.

Edison Electric Institute publications do not, generally,
answer this question directly. Instead, through innuendo,

they imply the data are biased.

For example, see: Edison

Electric Institute, Government Power, (New York Publication
Number 76-66, 1976), p. 50.

5.

/'

Edison Electric Institute, "Can Municipal Ownership Reduce
Electric Bills,"EEI Bulletin, (September/October, 1974)
-P' '3.
■
' ■ ■

6.

Ibid, p. 7.

7.

Frederick L. Bird and Frances M. Ryan, Public Ownership on
Trial, (New York, New Republic, Inc., 1930), p. XV.

8.

Robert A, Meyer, "Publicly Owned Versus Privately Owned
Utilities: A Policy Choice," The Review of Economics
and Statistics, (57:4, November, 1975), pp. 391-399,

9.

Audie L. Bevins, Jr., "Public Response to Municipally
Owned Utilities in Wyoming,"Land Economics, (52:2,
May, 1976), pp. 241-245.

10.

Richard B. Mancke, Squeaking By: U.S. Energy Policy Since
the Embargo, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1976),
pp. 134-136.

\

11. 19^75 was used as the test year as that was the only infor
mation available during the research phase o£ this project.
12.

For a thorough analysis o£ this concept, see: C. William
Emory, Business Research Methods, (Homewood, Illnois,
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1976), pp. 372-379. .

Chapter 2

EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC POWER SYSTEMS

National Development

Publicly-owned systems for the generation, transmission,

and distribution of electrical energy have been a part of the
total power industry within the United States since the advent

of the industry in 1882.

It was in that year that Thomas

Edison demonstrated the feasibility of providing low cost
power for street lighting at his Pearl Street Station in New

York .City.

On that day, an industry was born.

Municipal

systems such as Danville, Virginia, Danvers, Massachusetts,
and Detroit Lakes, Minnesota, date from the inceptiqn of this

industry on the American scene.^

Today, approximately 14%, or

30 million Americans, receive their electric power from local,
publicly-owned, electric utilities.

Another 91, or 19 million

citizens, receive their electric energy needs from rural
-

electric cooperatives.

2■

Although both publicly-owned and

investor-owned utilities appear to co-exist in relative calm
at the present, this has not always been the situation.

The

past is liberally laced with much acrimonious debate on which

type of system, publicly-owned or investor-owned, is better
suited to provide the public the electric power it needs for a
progressive and industrial society.

-11

In no other American industry have such fierce battles
been fought over which sector of the economy, the public or
private, should provide the consumer with electrical energy.
As ours is a capitalistic society, it has always worked out well

when private investment developed the necessary:plant and
competively marketed its product to the consumer.

Unfortu

nately, the electric power industry,; in order to avoid wastes
of capital investment resulting from the duplication of plant
and equipment, will work best when there is no competition.
Electric utilities must be a monopoly if costs are to be minimized.

And monopolies must be regulated by the government if we are to

be assured that the people do not suffer unwarranted abuses
and unrealistically high prices.

It appears, from the evidence

as cited, that the failure of the regulatory process as applied

to investor-owned electric utilities in the past was by far the
most prominent impetus for the development of the large
government owned and operated electric systems, such as the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and Bonneville Power Adminis

tration (BPA) that are so prominent on the national level today.
Public ownership of any industry that provides a societal

nebd is only necessary where effective regulation does not
exist.

If the private investor-Owned firm can produce results ,

favorable to the public's advantage, while still earning a

fair return on its. investment, the need for public ownership

ceases to exist.^

From the iiidustry's earliest moments, electric power was
looked upon as a social good.
the betterment of all.

It was to be a commodity for

It would be a major consumer necessity

for proyiding the good life; the American dream.

As such, its

cost to the consumer would have to be controlled because its

very naturb of^^^^ d

tended to^3.rd monopolistic practices.

From 1882^ through 1907, government felt that the best way
to control the industry and the prices it charged to the con
sumer was to promote vigorous competition within the; industry
amongst multiple investor-owned systems.

It was felt that

by awarding many service franchises to a multiplicity of firms,
one firm to a section of the governmental entity, such
competition would regulate rates and provide an impetus for

reliable service levels.
work out in practice.

Unfortunately, such a scheme did not

As is generally the case in a free market

society, the larger and stronger firms simply absorbed those

that were less economically sound.

The end result in many

areas of the country was the creation of large, unregulated
4
monopolies.

. '
■
The scheme of promoting vigorous competition

amongst privately owned competitors had failed.

By 1907, these giants of the industry had solidified their

position in the economic sense.

They had created powerful

monopolies and holding companies which determined who would

get electrical energy, when they would receive it, and how much

they would pay.

They were also astute enough to know that this

type of situation would not survive forever.

Already the

public and the "Populist Reform Movement'' were clamdting for
a national power policy and public ownership of the electriGal

industry.

It was about this same time (1907) that the private

investor-owned utilities saw state regulation of their opera
tions as the lessor of the major eVils with which they might

/ have to contend.

They preferred such regulation as more accept

able to the alternatives of municipal- ownership and/or compet
ition in their hard won service areas.^
Regulation of these private companies, however, was not

the panacea so many had envisioned. During the ensuing years,
the utilities took the state regulatory commissions to court

as particular cases warranted.

By their actions, they succeeded

in building a body of case law which protected their own special
interests.

-•

'

The industry,thus became more and more
reconciled to state regulation, while
large segments of the public became more
and more dissatisfied.^

v

The situation had deteriorated, at least in the eyes of the

public power advocates, to the point where it appeared that
the private interests had sought control of the government

in order to avoid being controlled.^
The result was political corruption in

American municipalities, for which public
ownership was to be a remedy.^

The remedy, however, was looked upon by the private interests
as an unwarranted intrusion of government into the private
sector.

It was blatant socialism.

Cities, it was reasoned

by the private business interests, should not undertake any

, ' . '■ ■
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.

ventures which are profitable; such ventures will always be

underta-ken more efficiently by private enterprise.^ Early
court cases, however, took a much different viewpoint.

The

courts reasoned that an enlargement of municipal activity under
the implied powers concept would provide greater opportunities
and benefits for the populace in general. . They viewed the for

mation of municipally owned electric utilities as a positive
action of government Vis-a-vis a strictly police action as^mani

fested in the regulation 6f private firms providing the sa-me

service.10 This attitude is succinctly presented in the court's
decision concerning the City of Henderson vs. Young (83S.W.; 583)

as cited in Pond.^1 In this action, the court felt that the
plaintiff's challenge against municipal ownership and operatibn
of the city's electrical system was not substantiated.

The

court's judgment said, in part:
In the management and operation of its
electric light plant, a city is not
exercising its governmental or legisla
tive powers, but its business powers,
nnd may conduct it in the manner Which

promises the greatest benefit to the city
and its inhabitants in the judgment of the
City Council; and it is not within the
province of the court to interfere. . . in
such matters.

This landmark decision provided a sound legal basis for the
formulation of municipal electric systems and at the same time

placed the regulatory function for such systems in the hands
of the local elected officials.

By this time in our history, public power interests were

beginning to marshal their forces and move ahead on large

-16- Vv :
national level programs.

For the reformers In American

politics, public ownership of electrical Systems was a
countervailing power of government to keep the greedy
private interests under control and to make the natural

resources of the nation aV'ailable to all of the people.
On June 3, 1916, the reformers, and others of similar

persuasion, witnessed theiplanting of the seed that would '

someday lift a vast segment of America out of the depths

of poyerty and provide ample low-cost electric power for
millions of Americans.

On that day. Congress approved the

National Defense Act which empowered the government to

harness the Tennessee Rivbr for nitrate and fertilizer pro
duction.

The production of these products would require

vast amounts of electrical energy which would be provided

by the many dam sites to be constructed for taming the river.
Unfortunately, it was not until 1933, or seventeen years
later, that the project which became known as the Tennessee

Valley Authority (TVA)

wbuld bear fruit.

The. private power

interests marshalled all the forces at their command to stop
this socialistic monster.

From the end of World War I through 1928, nearly every
session of Congress was disrupted over the question of

whether or not to surrender the still incomplete project.to
private investors or have the government complete it.

The

private utilities wanted to take over the project but they
lacked the necessary capital investment.

Senator Norris of

'

-17

Nebraska, in opposition to the private interests> wanted all
o£ the power generating sites within the watershed to remain

under federal control. In fact, it was his intention to develop

a national public power syste'ih such as those prevalent in Europe.
So intense was the debate during the years following the end of

World War I that the power generation capability of the only
completed TVA site, that at Muscle Shoals in northwestern Alabama,

sat idle and unused or, if generation was permitted, the production
was dumped at ridiculously low rates to the monopolistic private
utility operating at the plant site.

This sad state of affairs

was a direct result of Congressional inability, primarily those
of Republican persuasion, and the Republican Administrations of

the period, to approve the construction of government owned and

controlled transmission and distribution lines from the plant
site to the rural consumers.

It was not until 1932 that TVA

began to gather any national support.

The turning point was

the emergence of a powerful Democratic administration.

During Franklin D. Roosevelt's campaign for the presidential

election in 1932, he championed the promulgation of publiclyowned power projects to facilitate the broadest consumption of
power to strengthen a then faltering economy.

He also knew, from

his previous experience as a staunch promoter of the then

fledgling New York State Power Authority (NYSPA) created in
1931 when he was governor of that state, that publicly-owned

systems would act as an effective comparative regulatory yard
stick against investor owned monopolies.

The NYSPA was

created in 1931 after a long and bitter fight with the

private power interests.

Its major philosophy, and one that

Roosevelt now ehampioned at the national level, was that regu^
lation of the private companies had been ineffective and thaf
government competition had to be substituted in place of

co-opted regulatory commissions.

The authority planned to

accomplish these goals by developing the St. Lawrence Seaway
for navigation.

In so doing, it would construct a series of

dams with hydro-electric generating capacity.

The largest of

these sites is now located at Niagara Falls on the U.S./Canadian
border.

Wholesale power generated at these sites would then

be sold to private investor-owned utilities under the stipu
lation that specific retail rates, set by the Authority, would
be charged to the consumer.

These retail rates were not arbi

trary but were the result of extensive engineering studies and
set at reasonable levels.

To digress a moment, it might be

interesting to cite that the development of the St. Lawrence

Power Project was successfully thwarted by the private power
interests in the legislature until 1950.

At that time, when

the Authority adopted an attitude on non-competition with the

private interests, objection^ were withdrawn and the project

began in 1952.^^
During Roosevelt's first year in office as president, he

successfully launched the TVA as a government owned power
industry.

In 1933, the Tennessee Valley Authority Act (1933)

was passed into law by Congress.

The Act provided TVA with

the ability and resources to construct the power lines required

to deliver the electrical energy from the hydro sites to the
consumers.

The backs o£ the private utilities were broken.

They had been content to let the authority develop the entire
river as long as they took control of all the power at the
point of geiieration.

With TVA now in the transmission and

distribution business as well, it was able to cut retail

electric ra.tes for the consumers by approximately 60 percent.
TVA had proved, once the political constraints were

removed, that it was good for the industry to have government
Sponsbred competition; at least in that area CSoutheastern

United States) at that time.

Prior to TVA there was no compe

tition, or yardstick c|oncept, for the region, albeit, there
was regulation.

After the Authority's' creation and its intro

duction of lower retail rates, the surrounding private

^

utilities (Alabama Power and Georgia Power Cpmpanies) in the
area reduced their rates.

They also began to aggressively

seek out new consumers where before they had argued that new
customers were not cost-effective (i.e., the cost to serve them

' exceeded, the revenues to be gained).

Where previously all deci

sions as to whom to serve were purely rationalized from an

economic perspective, now they sought to grab as much territory
as possible from the emerging government giant.

This aggressive

expansion was continued by the private interests until 1939-40.

At that time, a "gentlemen's agreement" was entered into by
the Authority and the private utilities which defined the

geographic limits of TVA's service area.

After that agreement

was made, both Alabama Power and Georgia Power exhibited a

■-

'■^-■ -:'

helovr a^rerage gvovtlii^ in neTfi CAxs

is indicative of

not aggressively seeking out new business.

It appears that

they regressed from competitive to monopolistic practices oncer
assured that TVA would not encroach further on their service

areas.

|

Also, once the threat of direct competitidn lessened;,

the private utilities increased their retail power rates.

[

TVA successfully settled a regional problem regarding the

supply of electric power for all at reasonable rates.

problem had a national perspective.

But thei.

For example, according to^

the 1930 Census of Agriculture, an estimated 654,680 (10.4%) of

America's 6,295,000 farms were electrified.^^

It was obvious

that the private, investor-owned, utilities had not developed
an effective prdgram to provide power to America's rural areas.

They argued that the cost of;developing and maintaining electric
systems in such sparsely populated areas had minimal return on

the investment of capital required.

In response to such a

negative position, the proponents of rural electrification called
for massive government assistance.

The fight, however, was to

be long and hard in the political/industrial arena.
In 1923, Governor GiffordPinchot of Pennsylvania author
ized the' first "Giant Power Survey.

Its primary aim was to

coordinate development of the state's power resources by
private utilities under state regulation and planning.

The

survey, when completed, called for"holding company regulation,
lower rates for consumers, conservation, more efficient utiliz
ation of coal for power, and electrification of all farms in

the rural counties.

When in 1926, the State Public Utilities

Commission (PA) ordered the private utilities to extend elec

trical service into the rural areas of the state, "the order

was ignored with impunity

^ Unfortunately, this problem was

not limited to the State of Pennsylvania.

As with the creation of TVA, the program to electrify
America's farms received its biggest support from the Roose

velt Administration.

Interestingly, however, the support was

subsidiary to the administration's main target, that of breaking
up the giant holding companies which controiled most of the

operating utilities.

On May 11, 1935,

In the course of the legislative fight to
break up the power trust by striking
directly at holding-dompany control, Roose
velt issued an Executive Order temporarily
creating the Rural Eiectrification Adminis
tration (REA).26

s

The REA was created in order to provide capital funds at sub
stantially lower interest rates in order that the poorer rural

areas of the nation could obtain inexpensive electric power.
It. was originally envisioned to be a mutually beneficial and
cooperative effort between government and the private utilities.
The government would provide the funding at low interest rates

and the private utilities would devplop the necessary facilities.
But, the schism had been made.

The private utilities would have

no part in such a socialistic policy.

Because of shortsighted

goals and a fear of government control, the private utilities

refused REA funding.

The long and acrimonious battles between

utility management and the populist politicians had bred a
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mutual distrust,

;v:;;

l£ REA were to become a reality, it would have

to be a wholly public enterprise.

Oh May 20, 1936, the, REA was given permanent status by the
Congress.

There are some who speculate that it was passed not

as a plan to electrify the nation's rural areas, but more as a

method of increasing employment during that era of national
depression.

Also, interestingly enough, there were minimal

lobbying efforts by the private power interests at that point in

time. Most apparently felt that this was just another New Deal

program and, as such, was bound to be a short term problem.29
The growing success of REA, however, soon made it a prime
target of the private utilities.

Their strategy was to forestall it by
•

■
■ ■

moving into some profitabie areas that
hitherto were ignored and to impede the
REA's system of area coverage by build
ing lines that attracted just enough
potential customers to make the organ
ization of an REA cooperative impossible.

,

By very carefully planning the erection of single lines through
projected REA districts, they successfully fragmented the districts
so that all economies of scale would be lost.

The REA district

would find itself forced to form many smaller systems at a higher
cost than they would have had to bear had the larger single system
been developed.

Some operating companies acted in even more of

a disreputable manner.

Texas Power and Light Company, for example,

successfully persuaded an official of the Department of Agriculture
to disclose the specifics concerning the first Texas cooperative.
The Company then built many dissecting lines through the area to
make the formation of the cooperative financially prohibitive.

It is also interesting to note that the Company had previously

refused to serve this area because of the economics involved.^^
Another tactic utilized by the private utilities to hinder

and/or destroy the cooperatives was to lobby for the cooperatives
to be placed under state regulatory control.
they were successful.

In Massachusetts

Soon after, the State Public Utilities

Commission.rendered an unfavorable ruling which destroyed that

state's largest cooperative.^^

1

In spite of allthe obstacles, however, the REA is a

success.

As a competitor, it forced private companies to serve

areas which they had previously shunned.

A more positive

evaluation, however, is the 5.5 million Customers, or 19 million
citizens, that receive .their electrical needs through rural
cooperatives.

Development of large scale, government funded and sponsored,
electric power systems was not only limited to the industrial

east and the economically depressed south, however.

Roosevelt,

as well as other prominent advocates of public power systems,
wanted national development on a large scale.

The culmination

of this ideal was the development of the hydro-electric resources
in the Pacific Northwest under the guidance of the Bonneville
Power Administration (BPA).

Bonneville, as the first of many western projects, was to

improve navigation along the Columbia River by constructing

a series of dams.

As with the TVA, a beneficial externality of

this endeavor was toi be the generation of huge amounts of hydro
electric power.

The project was seen as an integral part of

the New Deal program for conservation and development of natural

resources for the benefit of all people in America.

The

i

investor-owned utilities in the region, however, as in the

development of TVA, were content fo have the government develop
the resources as long as they took delivery of the power at the
point of generation for subsequent delivery and sale to the
ultimate consumers.

A bitter struggle ensued between the public

power advocates who wanted independent administration of the

project for the benefit of all consumers and the private utility
interests.

The private utilities wanted the entire project to

be administered by the Corps of Engineers whose rate making and
distribution policies were quite favorable to the private sector.
The Engineers' prime concern was the navigational aspects of the
project; the sale of electricity was of secondary importance, and

as such, they had a tendency to dump the generated electricity at

ridiculously low rates as a matter of convenience.^^
On August 20, 1937, Roosevelt signed into law the Bonneville

Power Act.

It was in itself a victory for both sides in the

bitter dispute.

The Corps of Engineers were to be responsible

for the generation and sale of the electric power that was
generated at each dam site.

The rates to be charged, however, were

to be determined by a civilian administrator working within the
Department of Interior.

Under this arrangement, the private

utilities would still get most of the power generated, but they
would pay reasonable rates and not be subsidized at government
expense.

The Act also provided for the interconnection of all

Federal Projects in the region.

It was felt that this neophyte

of a national grid system^^ would benefit all public power
projects, especially those not yet completed.^^ The Act
further envisioned that the greatest benefits would accrue after

the interconnection of all privately-owned systems to the grid as
well as the publicly-owned ones.

This/however, was not com

pleted until the advent of World Warll.

The War Production

Board accomplished what years of negotiation could not. War'

Production Board Order 1-94 interconnected the federal system at
Bonneville with all major electrical systems in the area.

This system, which the private interests vehemently opposed, is
still in operation to this date.

Development Within California

In many respects, the development of publicly owned electric
power systems in California is a microcosm of the national effort.

A majoy distinction, however, is that most California systems are

municipal in scope and concerned with the distribution of power
at the retail level as a result of the lack of private initiative
in developing electric systems in the unprofitable suburban cpm

munities or, in cities where private interests had developed
adequate systems, as a means of lowering rates which were con
sidered excessive at the time.

The first city in California to acquire and operate its own

electric system was Alameda in 1887

Initially, it acquired

the plant from a private company for the purpose of street light
ing only.

In 1898, eleven years later, it expanded its service

area to include residential and cornmercjial customers as well.
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Palo Alto (1898) and Ukiah.(1899) embarked into the electric

power business by buying out the private systems that were already
serving the communities.

Both public systems were initiated

after voter approval, but for different reasons.

In Palo Alto,

the people were dissatisfied over the high rates being charged
for service by the private company.

After acquisition by the

city, the rates for electricity were reduced by one half.

In

spite of this massive reduction in revenues, the Palo Alto system
continued to show an operating profit.

Ukiah, however, found it

necessary to enter the power business because the private system

serving the area had been unsuccessful and failed.
Anaheim (1894), Colton (1896), Riverside (1896), and

Santa Clara (1896) are furthfer examples of California cities which

entered the industry by default.-^

At the time that the citizens

of these communities desired the advantages of electrical power

and street lighting, there Were no private firms willing to
provide such services.

It has also been noted that there was a

strong Populist sentiment in these communities at the time for

municipal vis-a-vis private ownership.

Again, all of these

systems were supported by approval of the voters to sell the,
necessary bonds for the initial capital investment.

Roseville (1910) is an example of a California community
which entered into direct competition with a privately-owned '
utility.

One of the city councilmen, upon learning that the

cost of producing and delivering the electrical energy sold in
the city was considerably less than that cost which the consumers

were paying, launched a campaign that the city should have its

own system.

The private company, however, refused to sell its

facilities.

Therefore, the city, after voter approval, built

its own system and went into direct competition.

Roseville

instituted a fifty cent flat monthly rate and, in spite of the

relatively low rate, showed an operating profit. The private
firm was forced, because.of the competition, to lower its rates.

The city then lowered its flat rate to twenty-five cents per
month.

In 1920, the private firm called it quits and sold all

of its facilities to the city.

Burbank (1913), in contrast, had encouraged the private
development of its electrical system.

When the private

utility found itself unable to complete the project, the city
voted a bond issue, purchased the partially completed system,
and has been in the power business ever since.

Not all of the municipal ventures into the power industry

have been easy or without intense confrontation. It appears
that when government developed systems in areas hot served by
private interests, or in marginal profit areas, the fight to

halt this public encroachment on the private sector was minimal,
if any was made at all.

However, when government attempted to

take over a high density urban are'a the fighting was long and

bitter. Such was the case with the development of the Los Angeles
Municipal Electric System.

The acquisition of that system from

the private utilities consumed eight years of litigation and
much acrimonious debate and political obstruction.'^^

The distribution and sale of electric energy by a publiclyowned power company in the City of Los Angeles manifested itself

as a natural by-product from the development of tjxat city's
supply system bringing water from the high Sierras.

On its

long trek from the mountains, this aqueduct falls approximately
3,000 feet, a natural condition for the installation of multiple

hydro-electric generating facilities. Over a span of years, tbe
system was carefully designed to extract the maximum generation
from the water flow and the plans for such installations were

approved in 1910.

In 1911, the electorate of Los Angeles

approved, by a margin of ten to one, the municipal distribution

of such electric power vis-a-vis its sale to the private com
panies for resale to them.

The aqueduct system was completed in 1914, but it was not

until the spring of 1917, a full three years behind schedule,

that electric power generated by the aqueduct system began to
flow, on a limited basis, to the citizens of Los Angeles.
The Bureau of Power had, since the inception of the idea

for forming a municipal utility, tried unsuccessfully to acquire

the facilities of the private companies then serving the city.
In 1916, after extensive negotiations failed, the city began
to construct its own facilities on a limited basis.

After only

a few months of this limited competition, the municipal system
was able to take over approximately seventy percent of the
customers previously served by the private companies in those

areas.

When the Bureau of Power threatened to expand its service

area, one of the private firms. Southern California Edison,

realized

it could not compete and agreed to sell its facilities within the
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Bureau's operating area.

The other private firm, the Los,

Angeles Gas and Electric System^ refused to surrender its
facilities.
six years.

The litigation that followed consumed another
It was not until May, 1922, that the Bureau obtained

ownership through purchase of the facilities of the private
firms within its operational area.

The use of obstructive and

adroit litigation proved to be the most effective weapon in the
private utilities arsenal to delay, if not prevent, the success

ful formation of a municipal system in an area previously
served by them.

In the Los Angeles case, more than thirty

law suits were filed by the private power companies during the
six year period.

In California, it was the development of municipal hoire
rule that proved to be the greatest impetus for the creation of

municipally-owned electric systems.

The cities, being closer to

the problems of the people, could react to serve the citizens

with adequate power at reasonable rates.

The state, which

tried to regulate the private power companies through its Rail
road Commission, was too far removed from the problems to be
effective.

In fact, prior to 1910, the state didn't, seem con

cerned about the equitable distribution and sale of electric

power.

In that year, two major events occurred that insured

the survival of municipal power systems.

First, the California

.48
Supreme Court dec1ared;

"There is no provision in our state
constitution which either expressly or

by implication forbids the acquisition,
ownership, or operation of any such

public utilities by a municipality, or
prohibits the power to acquire, own, or
operate them."
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The right of a municipality to operate an electric system had
been favorably resolved in the courts

Second, and probably

more important and far reaching, was the overthrow of the

Southern Pacific machine in California politics by the election

of Hiram Johnson as governor.

His election spurred the legis

lature to pass many progressive measures Including, in 1911,

the right of municipal governments to acquire, own, and operate

all public utilities.^® The prior court opinion was now law.
In this favorable legal climate, the vigorous growth of solvent
and successful municipal systems thrived.
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;;y'mtA:;:analys
Rates

In the continuiBg debate over whether publicly or privatelyowned systems should provide America's electric power needs,, the

subject of rates charged to the consumers has always been one of
the principal arguments.

Advocates of public power systems, the

American Public Power Association (APPA), as was mentioned in the

introduction, constantly point with pride to the long established

fact that publicly-owned sy$tems continue to provide more energy
at less cost vis-a-vis the investor-owned systems.

Their pub

lished statistics for 1972 indicate that the annual consumption

by a residential consumer served by a publicly-owned Utility was
9630 Kilowatt-hours (KWH) at a cost of $156.95.

The average con

sumer served by a privately-owned utility, however, used only

7391 KWH at a cost of $178.96, which is 48.5% higher per KWH

consumed.^ This opinion, however, is not mutually shared by the
Edison Electric institute (EEI), the official lobbying organiz
ation for America's investor-owned utilities.

They claim that

the data utilized to support that claim is extracted from the

Federal Power Commission's "Statistics of Pub1icly Owned Electric

Utilities in the United States "is not complete and, therefore,
biased.

They further assert that the FPC massages some of the

data, that the municipal systems report partial and/or inaccurate

statistics, and, more importantly, that the data presented
-34-

■

:■

v.;; V;..

^

excludes a majority of the public power systems in the Dnited
States.

They claim that of 1,909 municipal systems in opera

tion during 1975, only 433, or approximately 23%, are included

in the federal publication.^ A first reaction to this claim
would be that the data is being manipulated to present govern

ment owned systems in the best of circumstances.

Close analysis,

however, tends to mitigate this reaction.
For example, one of the agencies excluded is the Power

Authority of the State of New York, a large wholesaler of
primarily inexpensive hydro-electric power.

It would appear
-7

that if this agency's operations were included,

the cost of

electricity provided by public systems would really be biased
towards the low end of the scale.

An additional fact is that

upon inspection one can observe that the sampling of municipal
systems included in the report represents a cross section of

the nation.

There does not appear to be any cluster of public

agencies which might be utilizing relatively inexpensive hydro
electric power vis-a-vis systems using more costly fossil fuels

for generation.

What is excluded, according to my analysis of

the California Utilities in the report, are those public

entities which are small in size with reyenues under $250,000
annually.

The exclusion of such data should have minimal impact

and bias on any study of nationaT proportion.

For the purpose of my analysis on rates within the State
of California, I have tried to include the maximum number of
publicly-owned utilities and all three of the investor-owned

systems.

The selection may not totally eliminate any inherent

biases, but it should provide meaningful and; fairly accurate
■data.

As of January, 1976, there were thirty-'two publicly-owned
electric utilities operating in the State.

Of this amount,

seventeen, or 53%, are included in this study.

The balance were

rejected because they either did not report any operating statis
tics to the Federal Power Commission, they were wholesale suppliers

only, or they lacked residential retail cus*tomers.^ Additionally,
in order to make the analysis more comparative, the data pertaining
to the individual rate classes represents sales to ultimate

fretail) customers only.

All resale power and internally used

power, both the delivered quantity and the associated revenues,

have been excluded except in the overall summary.
In order to make a meaningful analysis and to remove, as
completely as possible, any inherent biases, the municipal

systems have been broken down into two exclusive groups or cells,
as well as analyzed in the aggregate.

Also, a further division

was accomplished to illustrate cost differences apparent between
the utilities^located in the northern half of the state and those

in the southern segment.

The groupings and the typical monthly

electric bills as reported by the Federal Power Commission for

two "typical"^ consumption quantities are presented in Tables 3.1,
3.2 and 3.3.
appendix).

(For more detail, see schedules 1 and 2 in the

.:TABLE:';3.i
Typica1 Residentia1 Monthly E1ectric Bills
In California - 1975

iRvestor-Ovrned Private Utility Companies
.

Typical Monthly
' ■ ■Bill ■

Company (Ra^k Orderiv

500 KWH 750 KWH

Pacific Gas ^ Electric (n)
San Diego Gas 6 Electric (s)

$14.66
17.98

$19.97
24.88

21.40

29.11

So. California Edison (s)

Statistics
.

■500 KWH

750 KWH

x=$18.01
s=2.779

x=$24.65
s=3.755

n=3

n=3

(n) = Private Utility in Nprthern California
(s) = Private Utility in Southern California
Source:

U.S. Federal Power Commission, "Typical Electric Bills 

■ 1975" ■

•

;. ■ ■;■ ■

■ ;;■

TABLE 3.2

Typical Residential Monthly Electric Bills
;in California - 1975
:
Municipal Systems Without Generation

•

~

^

""""

Typical Monthly

/

Statistics

~ ~

System-(Rank Order)*

.
Bill ■
500 KWH 750 KWH

500 KWH

Redding (n)
Palo Alto (n)

$ 6.57
8.91

$ 8.59
11.69

x=$14.54

x=$19.54

Santa Clara (n)
Roseville (n)
Alameda (n)
Ukiah (n)
Anaheim (s)
Riverside (s)
Colton (s)

9.40
9.60
13.71
14.40
19.41
20.52
20.61

12.63
12.40
18.94
19.40
26.29
27.39
27.66

s=5.500

0=7.566

n=10

n-10

Azuza (s)

22.25

30.43

750 KWH

(n) = Municipal Utility in Northern California
(s) = Municipal Utility in Southern California
Source:

U.S. Federal Power Commission, "Typical Electric Bills 

1975" ,■

■ -.

: ■ , ■ ■ ■ • ■. • ;.;.■

*Rank order is determined at the 500 "KWH consumption level.

•

■

TABLE: 3;;3 ;

Typical- Residential Monthly Electric Bills
In California - 1975

Municipal Systems With Generating Capacity
. Typical Monthly
: ■ ■ ■- - .

Statistics

■ Bill- .

System CRanh Order)

500 KWH 750 KWH

Sacramento (n)
Turlock* (n)
Imperial* (s)
Burhank (s)

$10.27
11.54
15.30
16.10
16.49

$13.37
14.86
21.08
21.91
22.77

17.90
21.00

25.78
29.25

Los Angeles (s)
Glendale (s)
Pasadena (s)

500 KWH

x=$15.51

750 KWH

s=3.390

x=$21.29
.
s-5.213

n=7

n-7

(n) = Municipal Utility in Northern California
(s) - Municipal Utility in Southern California

Source: ,

U.S. Federal Power Commission, "Typical Electric Bills 
1975" ■ ■

■

* Irrigation Districts

Prior to analyzing the apparent differences in typical electric bills

for consumers served by publicly-owned systems versus priVately-held'
companies, a major point requires some discussion.

It is evident

upon examination of the tables that the consumers located in the

northern segment of the state enjoy a major advantage over theirs

southern counterparts in the average cOst of energy consumed.

This

situation exists for all three classes of suppliers, allaeit, muni
cipal systems have a decided advantage in lower charges to the
ultimate consumer.

The primary reason for this north/south dis

parity is, it was learned, the availability of relatively inexpensive
hydro-electric power from many federal and state projects for these

northern California systems.^ Palo Alto, for example, paid an
average unit price of 5.1 mils per Kilowatt hour, including wheeling

■■ ■ :

"■

■'-3.9-

•: ■ ■, :■ . ■ . ■ ■ ''

charges paid to Pacific Gas and Electric.

:v^

This low cost power was

purchased, under long terra contracts frbin the Central Valley
Project administered by the U. S. Bureau of Reclaraation.

The

Project also supplies power to Sacramento, Santa Clara, Redding,
Roseville, Gridley, Biggs, et al, at the same basic rate of 4.5 rails

per Kilowatt hour, plus wheeling charges.®

While Pacific Gas and

Electric does not receive any power from the Central Valley Project,

it does receive considerable araoUnts of coraparably priced energy
from the Bonneville Power Administration, the Colorado River Project,

and numerous hydro-electric projects owned by itself and government.
The effect of this influx of inexpensive power is evident in Table

■3.1,. ■; ' .

■■

.

In contrast, during the same pefiod of time. Riverside, Colton,

and Azuza were paying an average price of 2.16(f: per KWH for energy
to their sole supplier, the Southern California Edison Company.

This higher price is primarily the result of the unavailability of
inexpensive hydro-electric power to Southern California.

For example.

Pacific Gas and Electric generated 24.6% of its needs hydraulically
in' 1975 versus 8.7% hydro production for Southern California Edison.

(See Schedule 4).

It should be pointed out, also, that these percent

ages are additive to any low cost power delivered to those systems by
Federal and/or state projects.

With the geographical pricing differences now explained and

understood to be fairly equally distributed in both the public and
private systems, we can now examine any apparent pricing differ
ences to the ultimate consumers.

In other words, is it less

expensive to the consumer to be supplied by a publicly-owned or

investor owned electric utility?

^ ■ -40- /'v.

Again, inspection of Tables 5.1 thru 3.3 indicates the

following order of preferability, at least from the perspective
of cost, for a typical ultimate consumer:

^

Typical Monthly Cost
Choice

System

1
2

Municipal W/0 Generation
Municipal,with Generation

3

Investor Owned

500 KWH

750 KWH

$14.54
15.51

$19.54
21.29

18.01

24.65

It would appear from the ranking above that a municipal system

having no generation facilities of its own and relying wholly on
purchased power for resale offers the best rates to its customers.

As Table 3.2 points out, however, sixty percent of the municipals
in this 1class enjoy relatively inexpensive federal power while

forty percent must purchase considerably more expensive power from
the Southern California Edison Company.

Such a distribution would

tend to skew this average fate to the low side of the continuum.

Choice 2, the average of the municipal systems with their own

generation and limited supplemental energy purchases, would appear

to be the more representative for analysis.® It would appear, then,
from the data presented that a consumer served by a municipal

djtllity would have a cost advantage of $2.50, or 13.9 percent less,
each month if he were to consume 500 KWH of energy and a savings of

$3.36 , or 13.6 percent if he were at the 750 KWH consumption
level.

It appears that in California, at least, it is advan

tageous to the consumer to be served by a public system as
opposed.to a private one.

'
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: A

of comparing the rates charged by the different

utility classes would be to utilize the data as presented in the

annual Federal Power Commission Reports.

The total revenues ^

collected from each customer class (i.e. residential, commercial/

industrial, other) could be divided by the total KWH consumed by each
class to give the average KWH cost for each.

Such data is summar

ized in Table 3.4,and the detail can be found on Schedule 3^
located in the appendix.

TABLE 3.4

Summary of Comparative Rates Charged per KWH

Type of Utility

Average Cost per Kilowatt-hour
Residential Commercial/
Other
Overall''
Industrial

Municipal - No Generation

$ .0302

$ .0218

$ .0262

$ .0236

Municipal - With Generation

.0295

.0241

.0339

.0250

Private (Investor-Owned)

.0346

.0268

.0181

.0285

Source: Schedule 3, Appendix
*Includes power sold for resale

The average rates per KWH shown for municipal systems having no
generation have been skewed somewhat so that they do not correlate
with the distribution of typical monthly bills discussed earlier.
This is the result of the inclusion of the City of Vernon's muniIT
cipal system-^-^
within that class for this analysis.

Because of

Vernon's small residential customer group (38 consumers), they were
not included in the earlier data by the Federal Rower Commission.

Without the inclusion of Vernon, the average rates per KWH for

residential, commercial/industrial, and other would be $.0285,

0231, and $.0248 respectively.

These latter averages correlate;

more closely with the data as presented in the typical bill analysis

Again, upon inspection of the data in Table 3.4, it appears
that the rates charged by municipal systems are more favorable to
the consumer in all of the customer classes except "other." As

that customer class is primarily highway and street lighting and

other similar governmental uses, it is ironical that the private
utilities provide better rates for general government uses than do

the publicly-owned systems.

This may be indicative of the many

political ramifications inherent in rate making by elected

officials who must approve the rates charged by the publiclyowned systems.

In other words, increase the rates on those

items that have minimum impact on getting re-elected.
In summary, the data presented suggests that when looked

upon as a composite entity, publicly-owned systems provide lower
cost power to the ultimate consumers.

To find out how this is

accomplished, we will have to examine the costs associated with

providing power that are incurred by each type of utility.

Cost of Service

All of the utilities included in this study have reported

their operating expenses in the format prescribed by the Federal
Power Commission (FPG), albeit, as a review of Schedule 5

(appendix) will indicate, some of the municipal systems appear

to be careless as to what category they charge particular expenses.
Anaheim, for example claims no distribution expense but does have

an unreasonably high transmission cost per KWH sold. The jsame

situation holds true for Santa Clara.

also apparent:

Other such deviations are

This careless accounting for expenses by type

of activity will skew the data presented in the following tables

for each specific activity, but it is the total cost per KWIl

sold that wili be the more meaningful statistic for comparing
operating efficiency.

These total values appear reasonable and

inclusive of all costs.

The FPC system of accounts provides f<^r numerous account

distributions associated with operating and maintaining an
electrical utility system.

For statistical purposes, however,

the myriad of accounts are, according to the task performed,
grouped into one of five major cost center ca-j-egoj-les.

These

are Transmission Expense, Distribution'Expense, Customer Accounts
Expense, Administrative and General Expense, and Production
Expense.

These categories represent the five major elements of

the utility industry.

Transmission Expenses are costs associated with delivering
electrical energy from major point to major point within the
system, such as from the point of generation to a regional sub
station.

Distribution Expenses are the costs associated with

maintaining and operating the portion of the system that delivers

energy from the substation to the ultimate consumer.

At times,

especially for the smaller municipal systems, the distinction

becomes somewhat nebulous and may^account for their careless
control of cost accounting.

Customer Account Expenses are those costs incurred by the

utility for collecting revenues and maintaining customer records.
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It includes such tasks as meter reading, billing, credit opera
tions, and similar functions.

Administrative and General Expense

are those costs related to running the oyerall organization,

employee benefits, and all other costs not specifically Assigned
to one of the other primary cost centers.

It contains the overhead

costs associated with running the system.

The line of demarcation

between Customer Accounts and Administrative and General Expenses
is also, at timers, not readily defined and would account for

some shifting of expenses between categories.

The final major cost center is for Production Expense.

This

includes generation and/or purchased power expense plus the costs

for maintaining generating facilities.

It is generally a

fairly accurate accounting for all such expenses and shifting
to other categories should be minimar, if at all.

Table 3.5 provides the summary data for these types of
expenses categorized by the three major utility groups we are

analyzing.

The values are expressed in dollars ($.001 =1 mil)

as an expense per KWH sold.

For this analysis, the KWH sales

also include power sold for resale as all expenses, especially
production, would be attributable to total sales.

Source:

.0005

.0003

$ .0007

Transmission

See Schedule 5, Appendix

Privately Owned

With Generation

Municipal Ownership

Municipal Ownership
No Generation

Type o£ Utility

/

'

.0015

.0020

.0006

Distribution

0007

0009

0004

Customer
Accounts

0017

0019

0007

Administration
§ General

0145

0105

0173

Production

Average Expense per Kilowatt-Hour of Sales

Average Expense by Category per each KWH of Sales

TABLE 3.5

,0189

.0156

.0197

Total

I

cn

. I ,
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Because of the reasons already stated concerning the accuracy

^

of the accounting practices utilized by some of the municipal
systems, only the Production Expense and Total Operating
Expense per KWH of sales will he discussed.

These two unit

costs appear to be fairly accurate and of meaningful value
to the analysis.

There may, however, be some costs not accounted

for in the Total Operating Expense; specifically, personnel admin
istration and general administrative support for some of the
smaller municipal systems.

These costs are contained in the data

pertaining to all the large systems, such as Los Angeles, Sacramento,
Riverside, Anaheim, et al, but may not be included in the reporting
of the smaller cities.

It is felt, however, that such biases

will not significantly alter the results of the study.
As can be observed from Table 3.5, publicly owned systems

with their own generating facilities have the lowest operating
costs both for production and overall expense.

Second in rank

are the privately owned utilities, again in both expense cate

gories.

In last place, with the highest expense per KWH of

sales for both production and overall expenses, are the municipal
systems relying wholly on purchased power from other sources.

It

is interesting to note that their cost of production (purchased y

power) is 68 mils higher, or 64.8 percent greater, than the cost
the municipal systems ha\''ing their own generation must pay.

How

ever, as this cost is being expressed as a variable of KWH sales,
we will want to examine the line loss factor12 for each type of

system.

If the municipal systems having no generation capacity
{. .

also have the highest line loss factor, that would explain a

.

.

.

^

■ y:;;;::,

.y;;;.-: y-:; —

portion of the higher cost per KWH sold.

Table 3.6 presents

:these factors'.'/'

6',

Line Loss Factors by Type pf Utility

~ ~
Type of Utility

Gross Energy ^

Net Energy

Generated and/or

Sold

Purchased (MWH)

Municipal 
No Generation

6,519,770

CJ#rH)

Line
Loss Factor
(%0

6,229,255

3.38

26,335,422

9.97

112,513,539

8.26

,

Municipal 

With Generation
Privately-Owned

Source:

29,251^007

,

122,649,509

See Schedules 7, 8, and 9, Appendix

As can be observed, these municipal systems without generation
have, in the aggregate, the best line loss factor of the three

classes of utilit)y ownership under study.

The high average cost

of purchased power for these municipal systems, then, is apparently
the result of pricing policies of the suppliers and the regulatory
commission, in this case the Federal Power Commission.

Tax Effort

A final element of expense to be analyzed is tax payments.
For the privately-owned system we will include all taxes paid,
federal, state and local, as reported in the FPC "Statistics for
Private Utilities

For the publicly-owned systems we will use

the data as presented in the State Controller's Report labeled,

"contributions^to city."!^

The use of two separate source docu

ments Is necessitated because tlie pPC reports fail to list these

in-lieu tax contributions as an expense of the inunicipal systems.

Schedule 10 in the appendix illustrates this rather large dis
crepancy. The absence of these contributions in the FPC reports

mislead many into the philosophy that publicly-owned systems pro
duce a tax deficiency.

A case in point is that the Edison Electric

Institute devotes 10 pages in its publication on public power
towards this assertion of municipal systems paying minimal, if
any, taxes or making in-lieu tax contributions.

The fact is,

however, at least for most of the California public systems being
analyzed in this report, that a significant tax contribution is
paid.

TABLE 3.7

Tax Effort of Utilities in Relation to Sales
Taxes/In-Lieu

Type of Utility

Taxes as a
of Sales

Taxes/In-Lieu
Taxes per KWY
of Sales

Standard
Deviation
of Taxes as
a % of Sales
within class

Municipal Ownership
No Generation

10.3

$.0024

6.9

4.1

.0010

3.4

All Municipals

5.3

.0013

7.5

Privately-Owned

8.S

.0023

2.2

Municipal Ownership
With Generation

Source:

Schedule 6, Appendix

As the summary data in Table 3.7 indicates,^the highest tax
paying group of utilities are municipal systems lacking generating

capacity of their own, both as a percent of sales and as mils per
KWH of sales.

This class of ownership also has the highest standard

deviation which indicates a wide dispersion of in-lieu tax payments

for members within that group.
will support this statement.

A look at Schedule 6 in the Appendix
The primary reason for the hig-h in-lieu

tax effort, which merely shifts local tax burdens to the consumers

of electricity, is that the members of this group are all municipal
systems under local control.

In other words, the various city

councils can divert from these operating funds whatever monies

the system can bear, or local ordinances allow.

Riverside, for

example, pays 11.5 percent of its prior year's revenues to the
general fund of that city as a contribution in-lieu of taxes.

That formula is stipulated in the City Charter.

Because Of the

rapid escalation in the cost of electrical energy which we are
currently experiencing, the City of Riverside's Public Utilities .

Department claims it is now paying approximately 5.6 times more
tax than an investor-owned utility w;ith the same service area

would have to pay.

(See Schedule 6.1 in the Appendix).

example is the City of Palo Alto.

Another

Their Gehepal Fund simply

absorbs whatever balance of the revenues are left after all

utility expenses have been paid.

In the year under study, this

practice netted that city's general fund some $3,261,000 or 33.81

of the total revenues collected, placing Palo Alto in the position
of being the highest tax paying utility as a percent of gross sales

within the state.

One can argue that such taxing practices are
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inequitable to the consumer but, in juxtopqsition, one can argue

that as long as the local policy does not place the municipal
system in an uncompetitive position with surrounding investor-owned

utilities, the practice lightens the local property taxpayer's
burden.

It is simply a shift in the incidence of taxation and

may be more progressive in its application than the property tax.
Municipal systems having their own generation appear to-be
carrying a lesser portion of the tax load than their counter

parts in both sectors.

However, this observance may not hold

up under closer scrutiny.

Within this class of utility owner

ship are three regional systems which serve many cities and towns
in a large service area.

These three systems, or districts as

they are called, are Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD),
Imperial Irrigation District (IID), and Turlock Irrigation District

(TID).

Because they serve such a large geographic area, it.was

not possible to determine their true, if any, tax effort.

If we

were to exclude those three systems from the analysis, the tax

effort for this group of utility would become 4.9 percent instead
of 4.1 percent.

Privately-owned utilities pay higher taxes as a percent of

sales than do the municipals with generatioh and slightly less
than those municipals having no generating facilities.
The data, then, as summarized in Table 3.7, indicates that

most publicly-owned systems do, in the aggregate, carry a fair
, ■ ■■■ ' : '
■ • ■■ ■ , :
; . A , ■ ■ • ■ ■ ■ , .( • : :
^
■■ . ■
^
share of the local tax burden.

■

Summary

At the beginning of this chapter it wa^ determined that
municipal systems, on the average, provide lower rates for
energy to their consumers.

In the latter section of the chapter,

the task was to determine how this was accomplished.

The results

of this analysis are summarized in the following table.
Review of the data indicates that the municipal systems

having no generation, although they have the highest operating
cost per KWH"($.0197 + .0024 = .0271) of sales, offer the
lowest rates because the balance Cprofit) they require to pay
debt service and make capital improvements out of current income

is minimal.

On the other hand, the systems with generation, both

private and municipal, require larger balances for those same
items of expense.

In addition, the privately owned firms require

a sizable portion of that balance to pay dividends to the stock

holders; an expense the municipal systems do not have to bear as
each consumer on the system is a shareholder and gets his return
in lower rates for energy consumed.

Also, in most cases, he

enjoys a lower local tax rate because of the utility payments

to the general fund.

The Southern California Edison Company,

for example, paid put of earnings in the year under analysis

$120,186,000 to its stockholders.
KWH of sales.

This amounted to 23 mils per

Admittedly, these dividend earnings will generate

some additional tax at the State and Federal levels.

As such,

their exclusion in the analysis of tax effort may be a limitation

of this study,vbut hopefully not a significant One.

Unfortunately,

Source:

.0285

.0250

$.0236

Per KWH

.0186

.0156

$.0197

Per KWH

Operations

.0099

.0094

$.0039

.0023

.0010

$.0024

Per
KWH Sales

Cost of

Depreciation - Schedule 6.2, Appendix

Privately Owned

With Generation

Municipal 

No Generation

Municipal 

Type of Utility

Tax Effort

Net

Operating
Profit/KWH

Average

Revenue

3.8

Average

TABLE

.0025

.0030

$.0010

Per
KWH Sale

Depreciation

.0051

.0054

$.0005

Balance

I

I

cn

Available

this analysis of dividends paid out of earnings cannot be
continued to the other privately-owned utilities in this

study because of their extensive gas utility operations
which are included in the financial dividend data as reported.

This point, however, does not change the results as presented.
Municipal systems, on the average, provide less costly

energy primarily as a result of reasonable operating expenses
and no requirement for profits to be distributed out of
1 O

annual earnings. "

:

1.

ENDNOTES :

American Public Power Association, "The Peoples Right to
Choose," (December, 1974), p. 6.

2.

Edison Electric Institute, "Government Power," (New York,
1976) P'ublication Number 76-66, p. 50.

3.

Even if the Power Authority of New York's data \ms included,
it would not enter into the calculations of the municipal
systems as it has no residential or commercial sales.

4.

The California municipal utilities exeluded from this com
parative study and the associated reasons are as follows:
Utility

Reason for Exclusion

City of Banning
City of Biggs

5.

Did not report data
Did not report data

Calif. Dept. of Water Resources

No retail customers

City of Gridley
City of Healdsburg
HetchHetchy Water Supply Project
City of Lodi
City of Lompoc
Merced Irrigation District
Modesto Irrigation District
Oroville Wyandotte Irr. Dist.
San Francisco P.U.C.
Shasta Dam P.U.D.
Truckee Donner P.U.D.
Yuba County Water Agency

Did not report data
Did not report data
No residential customers
Did not report data
Did not report data
Wholesale only
Primarily Irrigation
Wholesale to PG § E
Wholesale only
Did not report data
Did not report data
Wholesale to PG § E

There is probably no such thing
sumption pattern.

as a typical monthly con

The figures used for consumption are

simply averages correlating somewhat to the nationwide
averages. As so often happens in the real world, the math
matical average does not, in fact, exist in that exact
numerical quantity.

6.

7.

This information was learned by interviewing officials of
the Palo Alto Electric Department in October, 1977.

Wheeling charges are those expenses paid to another utility /
by the recipient of power for transmitting such power over
another's lines from the site of generation.

This low cost power will not last indefinitely. The Bureau
of Reclamation is currently attempting to increase the base

rate from 4.5 mils to 11 mils (l.l<f) per KWH. This new rate,
however, will still be approximately 1/3 of the unit cost of

power paid by resale customers being served by private
utilities. Los Angeles Times, September 13. 1977. (Vol. XCVI)
p. 3, 24.
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9.

-55

Another point of consideration is that these typical rates
are in effect during portions of 1975. On January 1, 1976 j

the Edison Company, with Federal Power Commission approval,
imposed a 281 overall increase on the Southern California

municipals it provides with wholesale power.

10.

U.S. Federal Power Comraission, "Statistics of Publicly
Owned Electric Utilities in the United States,"

(1975).. ^

'■ ■

r

'Statistics of Privately
Owned Electric Utilities in the United States, S-260,
(1975).

11.

The Vernon system is owned by the city but is actually
managed and operated under contract by the Southern
California Edison Company.

12.

Line loss factor is that amount of energy, expressed as a
percent, that is lost to system impedance. It is calculated

by dividing the difference between system input and output
• by the system input.

1'3.



The cities of Riverside, Anaheim, Azuza, Colton, et al,
are currently before the Federal Power Commission and the

courts seeking relief from this apparent price squeeze.

14.

U.S. Federal Power Commission, op cit., p. 103-104.

15.

State of California, "Annual Report of Financial Transactions

Concerning Cities of Caiifornia," State Controller's
Office, (1974-75), pp. 224-227.
16.

Edison Electric Institute, op citv, p. 91-99a.

17.

Riverside Municipal Code. City of Riverside, California,
- 1304 (TJ, p. C46.

18

Moody's. Public Utility Manual, (New York, Moody's Investor ;
Service, Inc. , 1976) . This manual did segregate the
annual depreciation according to the major components of
the firm's revenue (i.e.. Electric, Gas, etc.). Stock
payments, however, were a total item paid out of all
income.
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TESTING THE HYPOTHESES

Three hypotheses were stated in the introduction.

In

Chapter 3, various data were analyzed and placed into equal
elements so that we might test the hypotheses as stated and,

determine, from the consumer's perspective, if publicly-owned
electric systems are advantageous.

Revenues

The first hypothesis to be tested for statistical signi
ficance concerns typical monthly bills for residential consumers

using a selected amount of energy each month.

Recalling Chapter 1,

the null hypothesis for this argument states:
Hq:

Publicly-owned utility charges for electrical
energy consumption are equal to or less than

those charges for the same consumption from
a privately-owned utility.
The alternative of our hypothesis states:

H^:

Publicly-owned utility charges for electrical
energy consumption are more than those charges

for the same consumption from a privately-owned
utility.

^

/

As the data from both of the sample populations is ratio, having

both an origin (zero) and a measure of absolute variability,^
we will test for statistical significance using_a-parametric test

for ascertaining any difference resulting from two independent

samples.

The'selected formula is:^
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t =

fx. - Xi.1

/_si
/ N,

11
N,

The dollar values for the typical monthly bills under consideration
have been presented in Chapter 3 and are tabulated on Schedule 1
(Appendix).

They are reproduced here for convenience.

Table 4.1

Typical Monthly Electric Bills
Type of Utility
Ownership

Typical Monthly Bill
500 KWH

750 KWH

Standard Deviation
500 KWH
750 KWH

N

Public^ 
$ 14.54

$ 19.54

5.500

7.566

10

Public 
Generation

15.51

21.29

3.390

5.213

^7

Public - All

14.94

20.26

4.770

6.753 ^

Private - All

18.01

24.65

2.779

3. 775

No Generation

Source:

17
3

Appendix, Schedule 1

To test the hypothesis, we will compare the aggregate data for

all of the municipals against similar data pertaining to the privately
owned utility charges.

We will utilize a one-tailed test as we are

only concerned with higher costs.

It also appears reasonable to

test at a 95 percent confidence leVel (oc = .05) whereby we have a
5

percent probability of rejecting a true hypothesis.

In our

first test, using the data as presented for the 500 Kilowatt hour

(KWH) consumption level, we calculate a t value^ of 1.552 (See
Appendix, Schedule 11).

The critical value for this,test 'is 1.734.

As the calculated value is less than the critical value, we Sail
to reject the null hypothesis.

The statistical conclusion'



reached, within the parameters as outlined, is that at the 500

KWH consumption level, a consumer receives equal or less costly
electrical energy from a publicly-owned utility than he would
from a privately-owned one.

less.

The raw data indicates it would be

The calculations using the values applicable to the 750

KWH consumption class produced the ^same results.

The null hypothesis

failed to be rejected and the operational objective was supported
(See Schedule 12).

The conclusion, then, based on the data as

analyzed for residential consumers, was

that such consumers paid

less for energy if they were supplied by a publicly-owned utility
vis-a-vis a privately-owned one.
Typical bills, however, are net conclusive evidence of

overall less expensive energy rates.

Public systems may have

lower rates only in the beginning energy blocks^ that were tested
in these typical bills and have more expensive units costs in
the higher consiamption blocks.

To determine if this bias exists

in our data, we will apply the same test to the average unit
cost for residential service.
3.5.

The data was presented in Table

We will test the higher of the municipal residential

averages ($.302 per KWH) found to exist for those public systems
having no^generation against the private utility average of

$.0346 per KWH.

If it is found that statistical significance

supports the apparent difference, we can then infer that the

still lower rate of $.0295 charged by those muhicipal systems

having generation would also be supported as being statistically
less.

The calculations for this test can be found on Schedule 13

(Appendix).

Again, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected and

the apparent results that, on the average, residential rates in

California are lower if the energy is purchased from a publicly ^
owned utility was supported.

Similar logic was applied to testing the.,apparent validity
that publicly-owned utility rates for commercial and industrial

uses were also lower in the average.

The t test (Schedule 13)

again supported the operational objective of lower rates being
charged by municipal systems to the ultimate users, although, in
this instance, the apparent charges were only marginally favorable

fbr the publicly-owned systems.

No tests were applied for the

final rate category of "other."

The data and discussion as

presented in Chapter 3 clearly indicate that the private systems
offer better rates in this minor category of sales.

Cost of Service

)

In the introduction, we postulated a hypothesis that the

overall cost of maintenance and operations (operational costs)
would be equal to or less for publicly-owned systems than

for privately-owned utilities.

Prior to ev,aluating the results

of this analysis on overall cost of service, however, a second,
or subordinate hypothesis has emerged that warrants independent
consideration and comment.

Production Expense.

As was presented in Table 3.5, Municipal Systems having no
generating capacity of their own and relying wholly on purchased

power for resale appear to have the highest unit cost for pro

duction while municipal systems v/ith generating 'facilities appear
to have the smallest unit costs.

The distribution of this expense

by class of utility ownership was, as you recall:
,r

■

■

■

,

■

■'

^ , .

'

•

. .

■

•

■.

Municipal Ownership - No Generation:
Municipal Ownership - Generation:
Privately-Owned

"

■ f

' '. " '

$.0173/KWH
.0105/KWH
.0145/KWH

.
v

To determine if these apparent price differentials were statis
tically significant, at test for determining such significance

between two independent means was applied (See Appendix, Schedule
14).

The null hypothesis which we' intend to prove states:

Hq:

Publicly-owned utilities have a cost of production
which is equal to or greater than the production
costs of a privately-owned utility.

The logical opposite is:

H^:

Publicly-owned utilities have a cost of production
which is less than the production costs of a
privately-owned utility.

Our operational parameters where, as in the case of revenues, a

one tailed test at the ninety-five percent confidence level

= .OS).

First to be tested was the apparent cost difference between muni

'cipal systems without generation and the privately owned utilities.
The significant value of t was 1.782 and our calculated value was

.875.

The decision, therefore, was to fail to reject the null hypo

thesis and to conclude that municipal systems relying wholly on pur

chased power have a statistically supported higher unit cost per KWH
for production expense than do privately-owned utilities.

The

significance of this finding is important to the future survival of
California's municipal utilities who rely wholly on.wholesale

purchase of power from privately owned systems.

It also supports

the concept that the regulatory agency, in this instance the

Federal Power Commission (FPC), has an inherent proclivity to

lapse into the role of protector for the private interests.^
It should be pointed out, however, that "capture" of the FPC by
those it is regulating is not implied.

What is implied is an

apparent weakness in the regulatory process itself.

Because

only a minor portion of electric sales are interstate (7.3% in
1970) and, therefore, under FPC jurisdiction, attempts at esti

mating the true costs for this function to set appropriate
prices has been subject to a probability of error and a high
degree of regulatory ef,fect.

Many opportunities to shift costs

for price setting tend to dilute the control and expected benefits

of regulation.® If one examines the costs of energy borne by
the five Southern California municipal systems who rely totally
on wholesale power purchases from the Southern California Edison

Company, this regulatory failure becomes somewhat illuminated by
the disparities evident among the multiple consumers.

Table 4.2

Southern California Edison Company - Wholesale Power Sales
Municipal Utility
Purchasing

Anaheim
Azuza
Colton

Riverside
Vernon

Cost/KWH

City's
Cost/KWH

Profit/KWH

$.0200

$.0224

$.0024

.0200
.0200
.0200
.0200

.0236
.0224
.0229
.0224

.0036
.0024
.0029

Edison's*

Edison's

.0024

Profit In
Percent

\ 12.0
18.0
12.0
14.5
12.0

*Cost of Generation + Transmission + Administrative fSchedule 5)

iSource:

Schedule 5, Appendix

This problem, or "price squeeze" is intended to place inordinate ^
pressure on such municipal systems in order to force dissatis

faction among their consumers.

This, in turn, will promote poli

tical pressure within the local Jurisdiction advocating the sale

of the publicly-owned system to the privately-owned one.
These practices are common in areas where the
commercial companies have an absolute monopoly

• on wholesale power.^

V

Overall Cost of Service

The tests conducted to validate the hypothesis covering
the overall cost of service for municipal systems vis-a-vis
privately-owned ones had the following results.

The null hypothe

sis stated:

Hq:

Publicly-owned utilities have an overall cost of
service which is equal to or less
privately-owned systems.

) than

Our alternative objective was:

'

Publicly-owned utilities have an overall cost of
service which is greater (>•) than privately owned
systems.

,

As the test was to ascertain the magnitude and statistical sig
nificance of greater or less (directional) a one tailed test

evaluating two independent means at the 95% confidence level was
performed.

The results, the details of which are on Schedule 15

(Appendix), demonstrate that municipal systems having no genera
ting facilities had a cost of service statistically equal to

privately-owned utilities per KWH of sales. On the other hand,
municipalssystem possessing their own generation also demonstrated

an equal overall cost of operations with the privately-owned
utilities, but considerably lower than their public soctor counter

parts lacMng generation.

In the first case, it is obvious
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that the biggest contributing factor to this apparent disparityis the high cost of purchased power for these municipal systems;
a situation we have already discussed and commented on.

Tax Effort

The final hypothesis to be tested for statistical signifi
cance is on the subject of tax effort by municipal systems vis
a-vis privately-owned ones.

The intent of this analysis was to

disprove the ubiquitous allegation that publicly-owned systems
do not carry a share of taxes proportional to those levied
against privately-owned utilities.

Hq:

The null hypothesis stated:

There is no significant difference in tax
effort between publicly and privately-owned

.

utilities.

The alternative hypothesis, or operational statement, stated:

Hg;:

There is a significant difference in tax effort
between publicly and privately-owned utilities.

Again, the t test for statistical significance between two

independent means was utilized.

For this test, however, because

we are testing for any appreciable difference in either a

positive or negative direction,- a two-tailed test at the 95 per
cent confidence level (2.5% in each direction) was utilized.

The

results, which are detailed on Schedule 16 (Appendix), again are
not consistent for municipal systems depending whether or not
they have generating capacity.

'

For the publicly-owned systems lacking generation, there

was no significant difference in their tax effort vis-a-vis the

privately-owned utilities.

Municipal systems having generation

however, had a significant difference.

Their apparent tak

■
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effort as a percent of sales was
4.1 percent.

shown on Table 3,8,

The privately-owned utilities had a calculated

tax effort of 8.5 percent of sales.

As was mentioned in

Chapter 3, however, this apparent disparity must be cautiously

received because of possible discrepancies in the reporting of
the data by such publicly-owned utilities, three of which are
multi-regional districts.

The more important test was between the tax effort of

municipal systems in the aggregate and the privately-owned
utilities.

In this test, the calculated value of t was insuf

ficient to reject the null hypothesis.

It can therefore be

concluded that the tax effort of publicly-owned systems does
not significantly differ from that of the privately-owned
utilities.

At this juncture, another comment should be made

regarding the tax effort of the utilities under study.
The publicly-owned systems pay all of their in-lieu taxes

or operating surpluses directly to the local jurisdictions
in which they operate.

In that way, all of the citizen-owners

maximize the benefit of public ownership at the local level.

The privately-owned utilities pay a substantial portion of their

tax effort to the federal government in the form of corporate

income taxes.

Two comments need be made concerning this form

of taxation on a public utility.

Because they are regulated monopolies, privately-owned

utilities are somewhat assured, over the long term, a
rate-of-return on investment.

In order to attain this target

profit, the utilities estimate the taxes to be paid in a given

year and then are allowed, with regulatory approval, to add
these anticipated costs to the rates for service.

In many

cases, however, and this condition did not apply to the
California private utilities in the year under analysis, no
federal taxes are payable due to operating losses, investment
credits, or any other of a myriad of reasons.

The effect^ then,

is that an estimated tax load has been passed on to the consumer
but never paid by the utility.

It is now estimated that this

"Phantom Utility Tax" adds approximately $1.5 billion nationwide

to the charges consumers of privately-owned utilities must phy.^
The final comment concerns the degree of benefit the local

consumer will accrue from a tax paid to the federal government.

There may or may not be any tangible benefit that iS directly
attributable to such payments.

In juxtapositionj the local in-

lieu taxes paid by the municipal systems have very definite aiid
ascertainable benefits.

They greatly reduc.e the local taxing

effort required and produce tangible benefits in the form of
lower local taxes.

This is substantiated by an analysis of the

State Controller's Annual Report for fiscal 1975 which shows that

the weighted average tax rate per $100 of assessed valuation

for all California Cities was $2,040 in that year.

For California

cities possessing their own electric system, however, the
average tax rate was $1,449 or 29% less.
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DISCUSSIOR-ANI) CONCLU

Realization of Purpose

In the introduction, three major objectives were postulated
which this study was to either support or reject.

The positions

assumed were:

1.

Rates for publicly-owned utilities would be lower
or equal to those of privately-owned utilities.

2.

Overall maintenance and operations costs for
publicly-owned utilities would be equal to or less
per Kilowatt hour of sales than similar costs in
curred by privately-owned utilities.

3.

Both publicly and privately-owned utilities
would have a comparable tax effort.

The analysis in Chapter 3, validated with tests for

statistical significance in Chapter 4, found that, taken in the

aggregate, rates were definitely lower in this test year for
consumers served by a publicly owned electric system in Calif
ornia in comparison to rates for similar service from a privately
owned utility.

The only area of rates where the privately

owned utilities had an apparent advantage in lower rates, was the

misceTlaneous category of "other."

As this rate type comprises

only 2.6 percent of total sales for the privately owned utilities,
any positive benefits to the average consumer would be negligible.
The inference of the data and the test results is that publiclyowned utilities have lower rates for residential, commercial, and

industrial consumers,/on the average, than do their private sector
counterparts.
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Cost of Service

The overall cost o:^ service was not consistent when compared,
to privately-owned utilities for each group of public systems.
For municipal Systems haying no generation, it was found
that their average Overall cost of operation was higher than

that of the privately-owned utilities.

In testing a subordinate

hypothesis, however, it was determined that the cause of this

apparent higher operating cost was the cost of purchased power
sustained by these municipal systems.

It was shown and supported

that these publicly-owned utilities had a higher cost of pro
duction (purchased power) than did either the privately-owned
utilities or the publicly-owned systems possessing internal
generating capacity.

The raw data also indicated that this latter

class of utility ownership had the lowest overall cost of
operations.

This finding tends to refute, albeit not absolutely, the
allegation made by the Edison Electric Institute (EEl) in Chapter
1.

It was their contention that municipal systems who relied

wholly on purchased wholesale power from a privately-owned system
would reap the benefits of certain economies built into that

system by the investors, ergo; they^could purchase power much
less expensively than they could generate it themselves.

The

data analyzed in this study does not support that statement.

We find, as was presented in Chapter 3, that publicly-oWned

systems having their own generation have average production
expenses that are much less than those experienced by the
privately-owned systems.

Continuing the comparison, we notice

that two publicly-owned systeiris in the same geographie area,
both comparable in size and operating statistics, having markedly

different production costs.

Burbank, which generates its own

power at an average cost of $.0181/KWH certainly has an advantage
over Riverside which purchases its power from the Edison Gompany
at an average rate of $.0229, an increase in expense of 26.5%.
(See Appendix, Schedule 5)

It's questionable if Riverside is

appreciating any of Edison's economies of scaled
For publicly-owned systems with generation capacity, the
analysis indicated and the statistical tests confirmed that they

had lower overall operations costs per KWH of sales.
The implications from these results are multifarious, but
one deserves comment.

If publicly-owned systems are to continue

to be viable entities and provide competitively priced energy,
they must embark upon a program of acquiring their own generation.
To rely solely on purchased power from an investor-owned utility

would tend to place them in a non-competitive position.^ A
second alternative would be to secure a long term contract for

firm, low cost energy from federal or state power projects.^
: ,

.\

\

;■ , ■ ,

^

■ ;

_
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Tax Effort

The study supported our hypothesis that public systems ,
vis-a-vis privately-owned systems had comparable tax efforts.

And, as was mentioned in Chapter 4, those communities having
municipal systems had a lower tax rate, on the average, than

did those cities lacking an electrical system.

An argument can

be made against these in-lieu tax contributions in that they

disguise the true cost of local government, especially if the

contribution is in excess of what a private enterprise would

pay in local taxes.^ This argument is not valid, of course, if
the rates are competitive with other suppliers in the area.

If

the municipal rates are equal or less than the competition, then
a large part of the cost of local government can be shifted from

the property tax payer to the user of electricity.

This approach

may even be more equitable and in keeping with the ability to

pay principle.'^ This concept would be especially valid if Roth's^
study which correlated higher income to higher energy consumption
was relevant to that community.
Concluding Remarks

Publicly-owned utilities in California have been evaluated

and statistically tested in this study.

They have been shown,

for this test year, to be viable enterprises and worthy of
continued support, both locally and nationally.

To remain

viable, however, they must remain businesslike in nature and

insulated from the vagaries of politicians who seek to satisfy
short-term goals and reap immediate prestige.

This has apparently

never been a problem in the past, based on the results of this

Study, but it could become a major detriment as sources of revenue

for local governments decrease in size.

The analysis of municipal

utility tax effort indicated that local governments forego no

benefits that might accrue from having an investor-owned utility
serving their jurisdiction.

On an average, the local governments

receive equal monetary payments from their own systems for

■ ■ '71-:, ,
general government purposes.

\ :^

This contribution, however, should

never be escalated to the point that the publicly owned utility

finds itself with rates that are no longer competitive or that
system maintenance has to be neglected.

^

:■
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The cities of Anaheim and Riverside are currently embarked
upon a program to purchase interest in various power plants
how under either design or construction.

2.

Riverside is currently attempting, through the courts, to
secure a portion of the power generated at the Navajo Project
near Page, Arizona. This action is being vigorously contested
by the Edison Company which now receives a sizable allotment.

3. : Frederick L. Bird and Frances M. Ryan, Public Ownership oh
Trial, (New York New Republic, Inc., 1930), p. 47.

4.

For a understanding of this concept of ability to pay, see:
Harold M. Groves and Robert L. Bish, Financing Government,
(New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. , 1973),
-

5.

pp. 16-20.
William E. Roth, "Micro-Data Measurement of Residential
Rate Restructuring," Public Utilities Fortnightly,

(97:2, January 15, 1976), pp. 28-34.

-11-

■

, ^

BIBLIOGRAPHY

American Public Power Association.

to Choose.

The People's Right

Washington, B.C., 1974.

Bevins, Audie L., Jr. "Public Response to Municipally Owned
Utilities in Wyoming," Land Economics, 52:2, (May, 1976)
pp. 241-245. ■

Bierman, H., and J. E. Hass. "Inflation, Equity, Efficiency, and
the Regulatory Pricing of Electricity," Public Policy, 25:5
(Summer, 1975), pp. 299-315.
■

■

• ■

■

.

■

;

■

Bird, Frederick L. and Frances M. Ryan.

^Trial.

New York:

. ;

■ ■■ , ■

J,

.

Public Ownership On

NeW Republic, 1930.

Breyer, S. G. and P. W. Macavoy. Energy Regulation by the
Federal Power Commission. Washington, B.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1974.
Bruning, James L. and B. L.- Kintz. Computational Handbook of
Statistics. 2nd ed. Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman
and Company, 1977.

Edison Electric Institute.
New York, 1976.

_.

Government Power.

Publication 76-66,

"Can Municipal Ownership Reduce Electric Bills,"

EEI Bulletin, (September/October, 1974).
Ellis, Clyde.T.

A Giant Step.

New York:

Random House, 1966.

Emory, C. William. Business Research Methods.
Illinois: Richard B. Irvin, 1976.

Homewood,

Funigiello, Phillip J. Toward A National Power Policy: The New
Beal and the Electric Utility Industry. Pittsburg:
University of Pittsburg Press, 1973.
Groves, Harold M. and Robert L. Bish. Financing Government
7th ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973.
Hellman, Richard. Government Competition in the Electric Utility
Industry. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972.
Hungerford, Edward. The Story of Public Utilities.
Arno Press, 1972.
Johnston, Bavid.

New York:

"Movement Seeks to Exorcise Phantom From

Utility Taxes," Los Angeles Times, February 19, 1978,
Part VI, pp. 1-2.

Kaufman, Alvin.

"Electric Power:

Regulation of a National

Monopoly,: Energy Supply and Government Policy, ed.

Robert J. Kalter and William A. Vogley, Ithaca, New York:
Cornell University Press, 1976.

Kaufman, Alvin and Douglas N. Jones.
:

Sec

"The Electric Utility

Concepts, Practices, and Problems,"

Congressional

■ liesearch Service, Library of Congress, Publication 77-46E,
Washington D.C.; February 24, 1977.

Manke, Richard B.

Embargo.

Squeaking By: U.S. Energy Policy Since the

New York:

Columbia University Press, 1976.

Meyer, Robert A. "Publicly Owned Versus Privately Owned Utilities:
A Policy Choice,'' The Review of Ecbnomics and Statistics,
57:4, CNovember 1975}, pp. 391-399i

Moody's. Public Utility Manual.
Service, 1976.

New York;

Moody's InVestors

,

National Civic Federation Commission on Public Ownership and
.Operation.

Report On Municipal and Private Operation of

Public Utilities.

New York:

1907.

Pond, Oscar Lewis. Municipal Control of Public Utilities.
York: The Columbia University Press, 1906.

Riverside Municipal Code.

New

Riverside, California: 1973.

Roth, William E. "Micro-Data Measurement of Residential Rate
Restructuring," Public Utilities Fortnightly, 97:2
CJanuary 15, 19,76), pp. 28-34.


Southern California Edison Company.
Report.

Financial and Statistical

1976.

State of California.

Annual Report: Financial Transactions

Concerning Cities of California.
Controller, 1974-75.

Sacramento:

State
"

U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Historical
Statistics of the United States - Colonial Times to 1970.

Parts I and II,

Washington, D.C,, U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1975 , pp. 457; 827.
U. S. Federal Power Commission.
D.C.:

National Power Survey, Washington

1964.

"

Statistics of Privately Owned Electric Utilities in

the United States.

Publication S-260, Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office, 1975.

.

Statistics of Publicly Owned Electric Utilities in

the United States.
Office, 1975.

Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing

Typical Electric Bills.

Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office, 1975,
Vennard, Edwin.

York:

The Electric Power Business.

Weiss, Leonard W.

New

"An Evaluation of Antitrust in the Electric

Power Industry,"

ed.

2nd ed.

McGraw Hill, 1970.

Promoting Competition in Regulated Markets;

A. Phillips, Washington, D.C.:

The Brookings' Institution,

1975, pp. 136-146.

Wildavsky, Arron. Dixon-Yates: A Study in Power Politics.
Haven: Yal^ University Press, 1962.

New

APPENDICES

K'

■

SlimRY

TYPICAL ELECTRIC BILLS - 1975
SOURCE: FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION REPORT
Cas o£ 1-1
Residential
500
KWH

MUNICIPALS

(N)
(S)
CS)

Alameda
Anaheim
Azuza

v

(S)

Burbank (G)

(S) Colton
(S)
(S)
(S)
(N)
(S)
(N)

Glendale (G)
Imperial (G)
Los Angeles (G)
Palo Alto
Pasadena CG)
Redding

(S)
(N)

Riverside
Roseville

(N)

Sacramento (G)

(N)
(N)
(N)

Santa Clara
Turlock (G)
Ukiah
Vernon

(P.7-15) Within Group
750
(Std. Devia.tion)
0

13.71
19.41
22.25
16.10
20.61
17.90
15.30
16.49
8.91
21.00
6.57
20.52
9.60
10.27
9.40
11.54
14.40

Schedule 1

-

KWH

18.94
26.29
30.43
21.91
27.66
25.78
21.08
22.77
11.69
29.25
8.59
27.39
12.40
13.37
12.63
14.86
19.40

Municipals:

/

Southern:

X = 18.84/25.84
s = 2.33/3.09
Northern:

X = 10.55/13..99
s = 2.41/3.42

No Data

PRIVATE*

(S)

San Diego G § E

(S)
CN)

So. Gal Edison
Pacific G § E

17.98
21.40
14.66

24.88
29.11
19.97

Southern =

X = 19.69/29.00

Siz5 = 1.71/2.12
Northern =

X = 14.66/19.97

*Average for Service Area (See Schedule 2)
Averages:
Municipals:
No Generation:

With Generation:

All Municipals:

Privately Owned

14.54
15.51
14.94

19.54
21.29
20.26

5.500
3.390
4.770

7.566
5.213
6.753

18.01

24.65

2.779

3. 775

(N) = Northern California
(S) = Southern Califorrnia

(G) = Municipal system with generating facilities
X

= mean; S - Standard deviation

AT - T

DETAIL - PRIVATELY OWNED
TYPICAL electric; BILLS - 1975

SOURCE:

FEDERAL POWER:Commission report;: ;
(as of l-i-75)

^
.
■Owned
Averages (Not Weighted)

(p. 7-15)

:

; 500 KWH

75R OT

:
Schedule 1.2

Standard Deviation
Within
Between

Company

500 KWH

Companies

750 KWH

500 KWH

750;

KWH

Ran Diego G§E (10)
Carlsbad
Chula Vista

18..02
17.. 70

Dana Point
Del Mar
Encinitas
Fallbrook
La Mesa
Lakeside
Lemon Grove

18.,02
18.. 02
18..02
18.,46
17. 70
18. 46
17. 70
17..70
179. 80
17, 98

National City
Total

Average

24.,92
24.,59
24.,92
24.,92
24..92
: 25. 36
24..59
25. 36
24..59
24.. 59
248. 76
24. 88

265

.283

374

374

480

469

So. Calif. Edison
Walnut
Tustin

So. El Monte
San Bernardino

Orange
Muscoy
Los Alamitos
La Canada
Hemet

Colton (SCE)
Total

Average

Pacific G8E (10)
Alum Rock
Castroville

East Palo Alto
Grass Valley
Mendota
Orcutt
Ronnert Park
San Francisco
Sohora
Wasco
Total

Average

,;

21..92
21..06
21..06
21., 06
21.,46
21.,92
21.. 06
21.,06
21.,46
21.,92
213..98
21.,40

29. 17
29. 63
28. 77
28. 77
29. 17
29. 63
291. 08
29. 11

14.27

19.58

; 1

29. 63
28. 77
28. 77
28. 77

02

20.33

14.27
14.72
15.02

19.58
20.03
20.33

14.72
15.02
13.52
15.02
15.02
146.60

20.03
20.33
18.83
20.33
20.33
199.70

14.66

19.97

AX-II

2. 751

3. 735

By Customer Class
(See Jschedules'
Mean Cost Per KWH
Comm/
Other
Indus.

Residential

Schedule 2

Standard Deviation Within Groi

Resi.

Comm/

Other

Indus.

Municipal - No Generation

Alameda
Anaheim
Azuza
Colton

Palo Alto

.0295
.0388

.0208
.0268

.0449
.0432

.0324

.0361
.0128
.0124
.0295
.0166
.0120
.0312
; .0242

.0183
.0102
.0389
.0183
.0179
.0250
.0402

Redding
Riverside
Roseville
Santa Clara
Ukian
Vernon

,

Group -Total (x)

.0302

.0299
.0257
.0455
.0286
:.0181
.0203
- 0375
.0162
.0089
.0170
.0323

.0116

0084

.0102

.0090

.0060

.0076

0058

0041

.0028

i

.0218

.0262

.0337
.0383
.0268
.0348
.0434

.0273
.0324
.0246
.0254
.0330

.0357
.0280
.0241
.0382
.0345

.0173

.0193

.0148
.0199

.0208
.0165

.0295

.0241

.0339

.0380
.0281

.0324
.0299
.0228

.0175
.0221
.0153

,0546

.0268

.0181

Municipal - Generation
Burbank
Glendale

Imperial
Los Angeles.
Pasadena
Sacramento
Turlock

Group Total (x)
■

■

.

.

(

Investor-Owned

San Diego G8E

So. Cal. Edison.0418

Pacific G4E
Group Total (x)

SOURCE:

Federal Power Commission, "Statistics o£ Publicly Owned
Electric Utilities in the United States
(1975), pp. 4R-6R

Federal Power Commission, "Statisticeof Privately Owned
Electric Utilities in the United Stated, (S-260, 1975) p. 402.

All-I

PRIVATELY-OWNED UTILITIES

ANALYSIS OF GENERATION MIX § INTERCHANGES
■ ■

San Diego

Pacific

Gas § Electric
: MWH.,

Schedule 3

■

So. California

Gas § Electric

%

Gas § Electric

MWH

MWH

%

Generation
Steam
Nuclear

Hydro
Other
Total Net Gen.
Purchases

Net Interchange
Total*

24035018
382946
'14326968
3246156

41.2

41991088

72.1

4975673

8.5
19.4

11311694

0.7
24.6
5.6

■■■ ■

58278455 100.0

6908725
643574

76.4
7.1

175047

1.9

36539

0.1

7727346

85.4

47657621

87.1

6068552
979465

11.1
1.8

316443
1005490
9049279

■

'

3.5 7 ■
11.1

100.0

40314586
73.6
2574296 : ■ 4.7
4732200
8.7

54705638 100.0

*Excludes wheeling gains/losses

SOURCE:

Federal Power Commission, "Statistics of Privately Owned
V
Electric Utilities in the United States, (S-260, 1975} p. 702

AIII-I

UTILITY'S COST OF SERVICE
analysis OF EXPENSES AS A FUNCTION OF GROSS KWH SALES

:

Schedule
Transmiss.

MUNICIPALS 
No Generation

'

. ■

Distri
bution

Cust.
Accts.

Admin. Gen/Pur

.0008
.0005
.0007
0
.0003
.0005

.0018
.0008
.0005
0
.0011

8 Gen.

Power

-

Alameda
Anaheim

0
.0010
0
0
.0006
0

Azuza
Colton

Palo Alto

Redding
Riverside
Roseville
Santa Clara
Ukiah

Vernon

.0001
0
.0022
0
0

■,

Class X

Total

-

.0007

.0018
0
.0010

.0086
.0003
.0008
.0015
.0022
0
.0017
.0004

0
.0007
.0001

.0008
.0014
.0015
0
.0017
.0001

.0006

.0004

.0007

.0009
.0010

V,'.' ■

. ■

, ■ ,^ ,■

.0157
.0224
.0236
.0224
.0053
.0055
.0229
.0062
.0102
.0162
.0224

.0201
.0247
.0259
.0310
.0076
.0076
.0268

.0173

.0197

.0109
.0124
.0203
.0230

S-.0073

MUNICIPALS 

With Generation
Burbank
Glendale

Imperial
Los Angeles
Pasadena
Sacramento
Turlock
Class X

.0004
.0001
.0003
.0004
.0007
.0002
.0000

.0003

.0022
.0020
.0016
.0023
.0020

.0014
.0019
.0018
.0022
.0021
.0011
.0017

.0181
.0180
.0144
.0116
.0196
,0049
.0028

.0230
.0227
.0189
.0176
.0252

.0017

.0009
.0007
.0008
.0011
.0008
.0005
.0007

.0020

.0009

.0019

.0105

.0156

.0011

.0078
.0069

S=.0062

PRIVATELY-OWNED

Pacific G8E

San Diego G§E
So. Cal Edison
Class X

.0003
.0006
.0007

.0018
.0013
.0012

.0008
.0009
.0006

.0015
.0021
.0018

.0106
.0207
.0175

.0150
.0256
.0218

.0005

.0015

.0007

.0017

.0145

.0189

S=.0042

Standard Deviation - Total Cost per KWH

Municipals - No Generation
S=,0078
Municipa1s - With Generation S=.0061
Privately Owned
S=.0043

SOURCE OF DATA:

See Schedules 7, 8 and 9

AIV-I

UHLITY'S COST OF SERVICE

analysis OF TOTAL TAXES (OR IN-LIEU TAXES) AS A
FUNCTION OF KWH SALES AND GROSS SALES
Gross
Elec.
Sales

Gross
Sales

Taxes/(I)

Taxes

In^Lieu

As %
Sales

(MWH)

M$

333041
1451294
124292
79051
695972
229306
875320
118142

800
4323

Taxes Per Std. Df
KWH Sold
Taxes £

$

:

% Sale:

MUNICIPALS 
No Generation
Alameda

7918
43016
4536
3004
9656
2652
29072
2054
13206
1888
31839
148841

Anaheim
Azuza
Colton
Palo Alto

Redding
Riverside
Roseville
Santa Clara
Ukiah
Vernon
Totals:
Class X

"

1013956
69310
1309571
6299255

799
418
3261
310
2085
430
2139
265
567
15397

■ 10.1
10.0
17.6
13.9
33.8
11.7
7.2
20.9
16.2
14.0
18.0

'.002
.003
.006

.005

S=6.9

.005
.001
.002
.004
.002
.004
.0004

10.3

.0024

7.0
10.2

.002
.004

4.2
9.1
0.8

.001

.003

4.1

.0010

8.4
4.3
9.3

.002
.003

8.5

.0023

5.3

.0013

MUNICIPAL^ 
With Generation
Burbank
Glendale

20872
22389
27518
447875
25627
70462

Imperial
Los Angeles
Pasadena

Sacramento
Turlock
Totals:
Class X

11822

626565

713266
652773
1080863
16267804
714343
6246692
659681
26335422

1459
2285

N/A

•

19029
2341
534

: S=3.4

■ ■■■ ■ ;

.0001

. ■ : ; n/av
25648 ;

PRIVATELY OWNED

Pacific G6E

1216080
283224
1559076
3058380

San Diego G§E
So Cal Edison
Totals:
Class X

52868212
8317821
51327506
112513539

10824(2)
12277(2)

■ ■

144478
258579

.002

S=2.2

Combined Total

All Municipals
775406

Source of Data:

32634677

41045

Schedules 7, 8 and 9

(1) Taxes paid by private firms are as reported to the Federal Power
Cpmmissionj taxes paid by public systems are as reported to the
State Controller.

(2) SOURCE:

Moody's Public Utility Manual, 1976.

AV-1

S-7.5

'

GOMPARISON OF UTILITY PAYMENTS TO GENERAL FUND

;

ELECTRIC FUND

V '' ^

BUDGET YEAR 1977-78

' VCltY:V •

.:yyInvestor-Gvm,ed■

V'

Gross Revenue

Utility

$39,335^000 , $39,335,009

Contribution to General Fund

3,514,000*

/

--

Property;■ Tax ■

Net Utility Plant @ 100% Inside City
Assessed Value @ 251
City Tax Rate @ $1.01 per $100
County Tax Rate @ $2.75 per $1(
Other Agencies Taxes @ $7.243 per $100
Total Taxes $11,003 per

2?i Franchise Tax

^

^ Operating Revenues =

'

A

30,500,000
7,625,000

; '

77,013
209,688
552,279

$

838,980

;

$39,335,00 X 2Vx 70% =
total taxes payable

550,690
^

TOTAL TAXES PAYABLE TO CITY GENERAL FUND

$ 3,514,000* V $ 1,389,670
$ 3,514,000

$

627,703

City utility pays 5.6 times as much to City General Fund as an investorowned utility.

*Based on prior year' s^ gross revenue exciuding fuel cost surcharge.

Does not include approximately $1 million paid for services rendered
by other departments and for City Hall debt service.

AV-II

COST OF SERVICE

ANNUAL DEPRECIATION RATE ON ELECTRIC PLANT
:;V ■ ; • •/.

..A'.;

ScJieUule 5.1

Annual

Depreciation
(M$)

Gross
Sales

(MWH)

Per KWH
Sales

MUNICIPAL
No Generation
With Generation
PRIVATE

6174

6299255

$.0010

78885

26335422

.0030

281165

112513539

.0025

Source of Data:

Municipal Systems
Private Systems

Schedules 8 and 9

Moody's Public Utility Manual, (New York, Moody's
Investors Service, Inc., 1976) p. 884, 1469, 2047.

AV-III

FEDERAL POWER CCMII^SION
STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY O^TOD ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE U.S. - 1975

Schedule 7

S-260

CALIFORNIA

Pacific Gas § Electric

San Diego Gas 6 Electric

4,806,718
5,905,981

Gross Utility Plant
Net Utility Plant

So. Gal. Edison

Totals

Percent

749,708

4,486,864

867,686

5,998,022

117,723
151,143
4,358
283,224

546,389
955,279
39,408
1,559,076

1,147,930
1,830,345
80,105

37.5
59.8
2.7

3,058,380

100.0

15,004
92,601

4,775
10,636

43,099

7,147
17,756
172,572
212,886

34,079
61,438
31,962
92,426
900,024
1,119,929

53,858
164,675
82,208
190,320
1,635,082
2,126,143

2.5
7.7
3.9
9.0
76.9
100.0

10,043,290
10,771,689

Revenues:

^

Residential

465,818'
713,923
36,339
1,216,080

Comm-l/Ind.
Other

Total Revenue*

;

Expenses:
Transmission
Distribution

j

Customer Accts. § Sales:
Admin § General

80,138
562,486
793,328

Generation/Purch. Power
Total Expenses
Interest on Debt
Taxes - Other

■

Income (Net)
Total Taxes

204,445

34,055

126,185

364,685

128,303
4,868
133,171

16,731

93,636
50,842
144,478

238,670
56,267
294,937

557

17,288
178,947

28,593

120,492

328,032

Comm'l/Ind.

2,566,292
389,159

542,888
62,990

2,412,878
302,100

5,522,058
754,249

■Other. ■
Total

13,996
2,969,447

693

606,571

; 5,562
2,720,540

20,251
6,296,558

Depreciation
: '! :: : ■' " ;

,

■ . ■.

. .

Number of Customers:
Residential

87.7
12.0
0.3
100.0

■MWH'Sales:' • 

16,582,796
31,314,339

Residential

■ Comm\l/Ind.

2,380,982

Other ;
TotaT Sales - Ultimate

50,278,117
52,868,212
58,494,398

Gross Sale (Inc. Resale)
MIVH Gen/Purchased (p 702) 

13,493,385^

3,101,853:
4,966,422;

33,178,034
68,240,904
4,415,970
105,834,908
112,513,539
122,649,509

31,960,143
1,785,869
47,239,397
51,327,506
55,105,852

^ 249^119
8,317,394
8,317,821
9,049,279

31.3
64.5
4.2

1M70

*Resale Data not Included Above
tesale: ■ :

' MWH'

Revenue (M$} ;
Rev. Per KWH ($)

2,590,095
; 52,478

427
16

4,088,109

6,678,631

97,438

149,932

.0203

.0375

.0238

,0225

Line Loss « 8.261

X cost per KIVH«.0133

Federal Power Coinmission

Statistics of Publicly-Owned Electric Utilities in the U.S. - 1975
Schedule 8

California - 1975
Retail - With Generation

Burbank

Gross Electric Plant
Net Electric Plant

83,927,670
35,923,127

Glendale

Imperial*

Los Angeles*

Pasadena

Sacramento*

Turlock*

105,742,569
59,652,677

109,968,093
56,926,647

2,276,943,107
1,804,508,513

90,685,388

808,977,591
722,081,336

76,924,358
66,122,422

3,553,168,776
2,789,397,809

153,567,689
278,525,057-^

35,187,564

5,472,259
6,021,407
328,827
11,822,493

229,425,721
374,646,530

6,558,930
37,532,939

44,183,087

8,340,546
16,026,327

Residential

$ 5,680,634

9.107,607

Coinm»l/Ind.

13,857,209

12,333,698

1,353,929

948,068
22,389,373

12,069,422
13,418,091
2,030,153
27,517,666

357,645
1,687,216
831,617
1,987,131
15,527,605
20,391,214
27,076
3,117,880

36,449,204
189,467,490
- 3,404,775
47,937,275

13,971,319
18,002,217
11,548
2,753,711

58,911,495

Other

Total Operating Income

20,871,772

15,782,632

1,260,454

447,875,378

25,627,327

34,464,741
810,048
70,462,35#

Totals

22,494,111

626,566,362

36.6
59.8
3.6
100.0

Ejcpenses::

In-Lieu Taxes

1,459,203

Depreciation (Annual)

2,540,630

81,003
1,307,944
441,884
1,255,772
11,760,955
14,847,558
12,985
3,152,891

408,538

1,282,314

292,538

$ 957,195

5,486,070

4,210,346

37,916
5,328

54,449
9,210

36,222
6,964
1,518
44,704

Transmission
Distribution
Customer Accounts

287,214
1,543,101
633,439
980,321

Admin. § Gen'l

Generation/Purchased Power 12,906,385
Total Expenses
16,350,460

Interest on Debt

Net Income (Reported)

18,595,633

288,604,196

73,545,6527

9,041,606

1,234,914
6,792,229
2,835,659
6,682,520
30,553,429
48,098,751
■ --533,864

27,259
1,113,100
447,842

18,227,362

1,154,847

5,449,451
78,884,596

692,388

25,068;399

1,305^772

87,961,444

5,181,236

1^^002,336

5,458,396;

110,841,231

43,111
7,023

239^293
28,688

1,398,637
213,539

494,641
1,452,270
568,977 •
1,515,010

1,094,421
1,866,501
4,549,123
0

51,428,799

2.2
12.5

24,355,051
49,964,379
276,053,684
410,843,519

32.2
67.2
100.0

""5.9

Number of Customers:

Residential
Comm*l/Ind.
Other

Total Customers
MVH ^ Sales
Residential
Comm'l/Ind,
Other

Total Sales (MVH)

;

Gross Sales (Inc. Resale)
MWH Gen/Purchased

28

33

43,272

63,692

168,592
507,315
37,359
713,266

238,006
380,874
33,893
652,773

713,266

652,773

747,109

688,493

450,783
545,552.
;84,078
1,080,413
1,080,863
1,217,216

5,355

10

90S

1,117,634

50,144

268,886

27,853
3,840
3,354
35,407

4,415,201

192,280
485,494
'36,569

2,034,017
2,334,463
38,951
4,407,431
6,246,692
7,229,741

283,377
302,766
19,968
606,111
659,681
729,201

7,782,256
15,526,295
644,138
23,972,689
26,335,422
29,251,007

959,793

152,486

10,969,831.
413,320
15,798,552
16,267,804

17,828,468

714,343
714,343
810,779

11,203

1,623,379

*Resale sales not included in data above.

Resale $
r' nm

8,851
450

2,352,866
469,452

28,588,565
1,839,261

312,125
53,570

31,262,407
2,362,735

Rev per IGVH ($)

.0197

.0050

.0155

.0058

.01323

X per KWH = .0094
Line Loss = 9.97^

86.1
13.2
0.7

32.5
64.7
2.8
100.0

California - 1975

Retail - No Generation

Gross, Utility Plant
Net Utility Plant

Schedule 9

Alameda

Anaheim

Azuza

8,268,905
5,406,909

45,327,737
34,396,721

4,857,526
2,571,415

179,059
153,302

26,764,422
18,010,476

3,115,969
4,576,271

13,337,136
29,186,675

1,640,832
2,702,310
192,628
4,535,770

1,188,739
1,640,232
174,919
3,003,890

2,152,728
7,088,987
414,374
9,656,089

Colton

Palo Alto

Revenue:

Residential

Comrn* 1/Ind.
Other

Total Revenues (Sales)

226,175"

492,681

7,918,413

43,016,492

0

1,423,723

0

0

407,049

600,285
254,416
601,899
5,243,557
6,700,157

0

124,607

682,282

208,644

785,596
1,154,259
32,507,872
35,871,450

93,206

0
0

207,876
796,296
3,708,744
5,328,609

Expenses:
Transmission
Distribution
Customer Accounts

Admin. 8 General
Purchased Power

Total Expenses
In-Lieu Taxes

Depreciation (Annual)
Number of Customers:
Residential

Comm'l/Ind.

■ /o 

■ -

■ ^O" :

229,010

1,390,463

22,908
2,216

61,707
7,379

Other

183

66,551
2,929,590
3,213,954
104,015
163,083

69,269

Other
Total MWH Sales

105,546
219,928
7,567
333,041

343,913
1,088,218
19,163
1,451,294

36,569
83,486
4,237
124,292

MWH Purchases

343,499

1,511,808

130,878

MWH Sales
Residential

Comm'l/Ind.

Interest on Debt

Net Income* (Reported)

o" .
1,168,106

402,900
6,334,541

2,449,872
188,060

:;

8,309
1,138
■ ■'I.: v' :^9l■^
9,538

25,130

Total # Customers

1,767,590

^ 1,062,711

1,014,959

6,294

21,126

915
574 3

:

0

:25,757

2,364
112

7,783

23,602

27,536
45,401
6,114
79,051

117,879
555,178
22,915
695,972

87,156

728,339

75,998

12,053

329,770

; 3;516,496

Califoinia - 1975 (Continued)

Redding

Schedule 9.1

Vemon

2,347,015
1,357,555

14,423,748
5,254,24i

Roseville

Santa Clara

8,057,446
5,186,154

45,054,230
33,269,941

3,189,547
2,127,233

31,546,534
23,650,077

$ 984,395

12,025,639
15,487,300^
1,558,864
29,071,803

1,004,623
1,008,732
41,089
2,054,444

3,344,678
9,654,074
207,546
13,206,298

0

2,213,882

0

0
0
0

117,017

1,611,454
56,431
2,652,280

73,559
1,300,774
783,034
1,221,298

0

175,572
122,568
184,730
1,263,962
1,746,832

20,045,656
23,424,321
■■ ,

■: ■ ■ ■ ■ •0 . .

281,294

•

257,694
113,775
181,930
735,177 V
1,288,576

:

■

51,285
4,397

192

211

948,872
892j134
46,581
1,887,587

47,073
115,162
1,121,525

10,382,789
12,596,671

82,196

7,243' ■
945
2

:

0.6

■ ■1,622

100.0

251,193

20.9

1,316,829
4,837,838

243,989

912,480

617,173

4,116,746

689,040

4,459,444
:109,031,779
124,066,280
911,757
>
6,174,149

70

38,012
28,563
2,735

0'

2.0
3.6
87.9

2,020

186,700
803,817
23,439
1,013,956

■ '■

4,125,581
3,979,312
2,470,164

49

54,868
60,743
2,531
118,142

596,985

.3.3 :

-' 3.2 ,

: i5Z

309,089

Q

■

4,513

96,570
129,956
2,780
229,306

-

7,368
512,437
62,620
137,319
29,325,317

; 2.5

1,912

5,057

125,269

100.0

3,905
- 1,103

35,185

■

372,634
31,839,060

39,749,517
105,308,689
4,783,920
148,842,126

30,540

8^190

875,320

■

26.7
70.8

72,493

55,893

41,567

5,906

31,460,520

907,339

0

9,526

524,664

190,016,169
131,384,024

30,045,061
619,682
521,280

1,400,777

■ .v■^0' :■ :■■■v■

1,486,275

6,948
2,386

•

Totals

Ukiah

Riverside

,

1,036,638

:
/

38

87.7
11.8

■147::■-: :

69,310

l,297,884 :
11,540
1,309,571

76,450

1,323,264

2,720^ ;;
1,275,945

ipd-0

76.8
2.3
100.0

'^O ■/
415,651 i

Line Loss =3.38%

220,303
V 29,268

144,588
6,299,255

6,519,770

1,090,656
1,379,659

X cost per KWH purchased - $109,031,779
•

:

6,519,770,000 = .01672

20,905,838

Analysis of
Gontributions to General Fund (In-Lieu Tax)
PPG Report vs. State Gontroller's Report

PPG Stats
1975

Gity/DistriCt

Alameda
Anaheim

104,015
1,459,203
188,060
12,985
3,404,775

Azuza

Burbank
Golton
Glendale

Los Angeles
Palo Alto "
Pasadena

11,548

Redding
Riverside
Roseville
Santa Glara
Ukiah
Vemon
TOTALS:

Source of Data:

NOTE: 74-75 Operating Stats
supplied to PPG as 1975
PY 1974-75
Gal. State
Gontroller

1974-75

800,000
4,323,302
799,300
1,459,203
417,815
2,284,931
19,029,000
3,260,566
2,341,278
310,229
2,085,407
430,000
2,138,951
265,000

619,682

567,482

5,800,268

40,512,464

VARJANGB

Amount

800,000
4,323,302
695,285
229,755
2,271,946
15,624,225
3,260,566
2,329,730
310,229
2,085,407
430,000
2,138,951
265,000

668.4
122.2

17,496.7
458.9

20,174.3

34,712,196

+598.5

■

U.S. Federal Power Gommission, "Statistics of Publicly-Owned Electric Utilities in the United States,"
(1975), p. 4R - 6R.
•/; ,
State of Galifomia, "Annual Report of Financial Transactions concerning Gities of Galifomia," State
Gontroller's Office (1974-75), p. 224-227.

Schedule 11

Statistical t Test

Two Independent Means

Average Private Utility bill compared to average of all public systems,
500 KWH.

Hq:
Hg^:

Publicly-owned utility bills are equal to or less
Publicly-owned utility bills are more

Formula:

fx. - xO

' s,Data:

_

S- 

Municipal

Private

X,= $14.94
S,=

4.770

N,=

17

ri4.94 - 18.011
t =/22.753 ^ 7.723

y

17

3

Xj.= $18.01
.
^

S,=

2.779

N^=

3

3.07
3.07
/ 3.913 " 1.978

=

1.552, d.f. =.18

^ ,

Significant value oft @ 18 d.f.^^^ = 1.734
Calculated value = 1.552

Decision:

Failed to reject Hq; Publicly-owned utility bills
appear to be lower

(1)
(2)

Source: C. WiMiam Emory, Business Research Methods, THomewood,
Illinois, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1976). pp. 390-1.

Source: ^ James L. Bruning and B. L. Kintz, Computational Handbook
of Statistics, (Glenview, Illinois, Scott, Foresman.and Company,
1977), p. 241.

AVIII-I

Schedule 12

Statistical t test

Two Independeiit Means

Average Private Utility\bill compared to average municipal utility
bill - 750 KWH.

Hypothesis
Formula;

Same as Schedu1e 11
Same as Schedule 11

Data:

Municipal

Private

ic, = 20.26

x^= 24.65

S,- 6.753

S^- 3.755

N, = 17

N^= 3

120.26 - 24.631

t = /45.60

^ 14.10

=

• 4.:39:-

:

4.39

=

1;616, d.f. -18

/ 7.;382:;;:,:.v: / 2.717 i.

17

Significant value Of t § 18 d.f. = 1.734
Calculated value =1.616

Decision: Failed to reject Hq; Publicly-owned utility bills
appear to^ be/:lower.l ': ^',

AVIII-Il

y,

Schedule 13

Statistical t Test

Two Independent Means
Hypothesis:

Same as Schedule 11
Same as Schedule 11

Formula:

- - - - - Residential - - - - 

Municipal - W/0 Gen.

Data;

Private

X,= .0302
S, = .0116

X;.= .0346
S.= .0058

N,= 11
1.0562 - .03461

t =

.ooqi

00003

10044

^

.0044

.00002

~

.0045

, 977y d.f. =12

11

Significant value o£ t @ 12 d.£. = 1.782
Calculated value = .977

Decision: Fail to reject Hgi Publicly-owned utility charges
.
Data:

are lower per KWH
- - - - - Commercial/Industrial - - - - 
Muriicipal - W/Gen.
;x

Private

.0241:

x^= .0268
Si= .0041

s;= .0060

N^= 3;
C.0241 - .02681

.0027

-_

.0027

.844, d.£.,= 8

t =

.00004

00002

J .00001

Signifleant Alalue o£ t @ 8 d.£ =
Calculated value = .844

.0032

1.860


Decision, Fail to reject Hq; Publicly-owned utility rates are
; lower per KWH.

AVIII-III

ocneauJ-tJ

xh

Statistical t Test

Two Independent Means

1.

Average cost o£ Production per KWH - Munici
ipal System without
generation vs. Privately-Owned systems.

Ho;
Ha^

Publicly-owned systems production costs are equal or greater
Publicly-owned systems production costs are less

Formula:

Same as Schedule 11

Data:

Municipal - W/0 Gen

t =

x,= .0173
S,= .0073

Xj.= .0145
S^= .0042

N = 11

Ni= 3

r.0173 - .0145i

.00005

/

11

Private

.00002

.0028
.00001

/

0028

^

.875, d.£. = 12

0032

Signi£icant value o£ t § 12 d.£ = 1.782
Calculated value o£ t = .875

Decision: Fail to reject Hqj Publicly-owned systems lacking
their own generation have higher production costs per KWH.

AVIII-IV

Schedule 15

.Statistical t Test

Two Independent Means

Q. Publicly-owned utili^

overall operations costs are equal or less

H

Hg.:
1.

Publicly-owned utility overallfoperations costs aro more

Average cost of operations per KWHr municipal systems without
generation vs. privately-owned systems.
Formula:

Same as Schedule 11

Data:

Municipal - W/0 Gen

;i'-.;. ' ':'

Private

.'iDiQ-7'-.

iCst,- .0180 ^

S,= .0078
,

'

V

Si.= .0043i:

= ll^ - 

t = r.0197 - .01891
00006

00002

.0008

^

/.OOOOl

.0008 _ .250, d.f.
.■.oo-32;;-i -. ■ ;vv:'^

12

11

Significant va'lue of t @ 12 d.f =1.782
Calculated value of t = .250

Decision: Fail to reject Hq. Publicly-owned systems without
generation have overall operational costs which are equal to
those of privately-owned systems.

Average cost of operations for municipal systems with generation
vs. privately-owned systems.
Data:

Municipal - W/Gen

icj = .0156
S, = .0061

t

=

r.0156
00004

i-

-

.01890
.00002

Private

x^= .0189
Si= .0043
N^= 3
.O033_ ^

/.00001

Significant value of t § 8 = 1.860

.0033

X

1.031, d.f. = 8

.0032
:

Calculated value of t = 1.031

Decision: Failed to rej ect Hq; Publicly-owned systems with
generation have lower overall operations costs.

AVIII-V

Statistical.- t Test

Two^ Indep-endent-' Means-^ .; '

Tax Effort as a percent of sales (Two-tailed test @ 95% confidence level):

1.

Hq:

There is no significant difference in tax effort.

Ha*.

There is a significant difference.

Municipal system without generation vs.. privately-owned system.
Formula:

Same as Schedule 11

Data:

Municipal - W/0 Gen

X j = 10.3
S,= 6.9

■

-

Xi= 8.5
Sj= 2.2

' ■ ■' ■y'-yr'-:

N. = 11
t = no. 5 - 8.51
1.8
/ 47.6 , 4.84 ~ /5.94

. : V: "IT- * "I—

Private

■ ■■

'

1.8 ■ ■ _
2.437' "

.739, d.f. == 12

Significant value of t @ 12 d.f. = 2.179

Calculated value of t = .^739
Decision: Fail to reject
; no significant difference exists
whereby local municipal systems have an equal tax effort as a
perc,ent"'of-sales-.
7'

2.

Municipal systems with generation vs. privately-owned systems.
Data: •

Municipal - W/Gen

Private

. ■ X, = 4.1

7

- 

Xj_= . '8.S".

S, = 3.4

.

S^= 2.2

N, = 7

3. ;^ ^

t = r4.1 - 8.5i
/II.57 - 4. 84
V
7 ■
3

4.4
/3. 266
^

_ 4.4
~ 1.807

2.435, d.f. = 8^^ :

'

Significant value of t @ 8 d. f. = 2.306
Calculated value of t = 2. 435 ^
^
^
,
Decision: Reject Hq: A significant difference in tax effort as
a percent of sales exists.

3.

Aggregate total of all municipal systems vs private systems.
Data:

Municipal

Private

: -.X,= -5.3,
S, = 7. 5
N, = 18 ■

t = 15.3 - 8.51

_

^56. 25 ^ 4.84 ~
"18~~ ■'■■~3~~ ■

A

■
3. 2

/4.738
■

: 3.2

" 2.177

x^ = 8.5
Sj^ = 2 . 2
N^= 3

:■

1.470, d.f. = 19

"

Significant value of t @ 19 d.f. =2.093
Calculated value of t - 1.470

Decision:

Fail to reject Hq; there is no difference in tax effort

in the aggregate.

•

.

